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Technology is at the heart of the three goals spelled out in the World Energy Council’s 
Statement, Energy for Tomorrow’s World – Acting Now! These are access to reliable 
and affordable modern energy services for all the world’s inhabitants, availability of high-
quality reliable delivered energy, and energy resources that are accepted as produced 
and used in harmony with the local, regional and global environment.  
 
With this in mind, the World Energy Council (WEC) at the time of the 1998 Houston 
Congress, foresaw a need to examine which energy technologies are likely to sustain 
the world in the 21st century, the steps that need be taken to ensure that these new 
technologies are available to the marketplace, and what role governments and industry 
might play. Up to one-half of historical growth in productivity is known to be due to 
technological change. Accordingly, in 1999 the WEC launched a major study on “Energy 
Technologies for the 21st Century”. The study had two parts. The first was to examine 
trends in public and private RD&D spending over the past 15 years to see what has 
been happening by technology area, with regard to the resource base for future 
development. A report on this part is published as a separate document in parallel with 
this report. 
 
The second part was to identify both those key technologies that might help achieve the 
three goals in the WEC statement, and what might be necessary to help bring them to 
market. This report represents the first phase of that part of the study. The authors, 
Nebojsa Nakicenovic and Keywan Riahi from the International Institute for Applied 
Systems Analysis (IIASA) use scenarios done for WEC, those done for the IPCC Special 
Report on Emissions Scenarios and the IPCC Third Assessment Report, and historical 
experience with technological learning to identify technologies that appear persistently in 
a significant class of scenarios and/or within a particular region. They have examined 
technologies associated with electrical generation, synthetic fuel production, carbon 
sequestration, transportation technologies and services and energy consumption 
patterns. As the authors state in this report, technological change is complex, fraught 
with many uncertainties, and inherently unpredictable. New discoveries, the role of 
embedded infrastructures, financing, and consumer preferences are impossible to 
determine a priori. By considering a range of possible developments, they identify and 
prioritize those technologies that appear to be robust, that is they are likely to have 
widespread dissemination and impact. These are technologies and technology areas 
worthy of the attention of industry and governments if they are to be deployed and 
disseminated as part of the process of sustainable economic development. The Study 
Group and the WEC thank the authors for their thoughtful and timely contribution to this 
important topic. 
 
WEC proposes to complete the study in the next few years. This next phase will 
examine other technologies and technological areas and those examined here in greater 
detail, including end-use and carbon sequestration. It will also examine the strategies of 
private industries and governments as well as the timing and possible costs of RD&D. 
The result will be a comprehensive view of strategies and policies on technology 
development and diffusion that appear most promising in an uncertain future. 
 
Robert Schock, Chairman 
Study Group on Energy Technologies for the 21st Century 
September 2001 
An Assessment of Technological Change
Across Selected Energy Scenarios
Nebojsa Nakicenovic and Keywan Riahi
July 2001
Introduction
Technological change is a complex process that is associated with many uncertainties. Its
future course is inherently unpredictable. The very fact that it is virtually impossible to
anticipate specific future technological change is what interests many researchers and
innovators. Discovering new possibilities and demonstrating unanticipated possibilities is
often what attracts their curiosity. Thus, the risk and opportunity are joint features of
technological change rendering the process inherently unpredictable. This is an important
reason why studies about future technologies need to consider a range of alternative
developments rather than attempting to project a particular direction of change. They
need to capture a wide spectrum of developments in order to assess the implications and
possibilities of different alternatives. Here we do so on the basis of energy scenarios that
contain assumptions about many different technologies, their costs and performance.
A number of economic studies have determined that up to half historical productivity
growth is due to technological change and the other half due to all other reasons such as
the growth of the labor force, labor productivity, capital stock, etc. The same is true for
technological change in scenarios about possible future energy developments.
Technological change may be more important in determining the structure of future
energy systems and services than some other major driving forces such as population
growth and economic development (Nakicenovic et al., 2000a). It should be noted
however that technological change in turn is and will continue to be driven by social and
economic transformations and human values. This is compounded by great uncertainty as
to how far social and economic change, shifting human values and lifestyles, and
environmental concerns will drive technological priorities. There is growing evidence in
energy scenarios that alternative technological developments resulting from many
specific assumptions in energy models can lead to fundamentally different future energy
systems structures and services (Alcamo and Nakicenovic, 1998; Nakicenovic, 2000;
EIA, 2000; Nakicenovic, Grübler and McDonald, 1998; Morita, Nakicenovic and
Robinson, 2000; Riahi and Roehrl, 2000a). For example, scenarios that assume relatively
2abundant and inexpensive fossil energy and technology availability also tend to have high
shares of these options. Scenarios with slow progress of fossil technologies often
anticipate high fossil energy costs (internal as well as external) and consequently a degree
of decarbonization of future energy systems. These two sets of assumptions are
frequently used as devices to accommodate paths of evolution, which are believed to be
less, or more, “sustainable” in terms of economic development; and less, or more,
compatible with mitigation of the environmental impacts.
Scenarios in the literature offer, in general, a large set of alternative future developments
that may be used to assess the ranges and distributions of costs and other characteristics
of future energy technologies. These should not, of course, be confused with actual future
developments that are unpredictable. Scenarios in the literature may include the actual
future development path(s), but this need not necessarily be the case. Surprises and
“extreme events” are often situated outside the envelope of future developments
encompassed by the scenarios in the literature. Nevertheless, the analysis of the range of
future technology characteristics across scenarios in the literature is one of the very few
methods available for assessing alternative developments. Another is to conduct “Delphi”
studies or other ways of polling the views of experts.
Our approach here is to assess the ranges of deployment and characteristics of future
energy technologies on the basis of a number of scenarios developed at IIASA by the
MESSAGE energy systems model (Messner and Strubegger, 1995). The reason for
choosing one single model for this analysis is simply that detailed information for this
model is available and documented in the literature (Riahi and Roehrl, 2000b; IIASA web
site; CIESIN web site; Roehrl and Riahi, 2000, etc.). Comparable information is to the
best of our knowledge not available at this time for other energy models that contain a
high degree of technological resolution (i.e., for other so-called systems-engineering
energy models that provide sufficient resolution of the underlying technological detail).
Another, completely different reason, for choosing the MESSAGE model is that it was
one of the models used to develop both the IIASA-WEC (Nakicenovic, Grübler and
McDonald, 1998) and IPCC (Nakicenovic et al., 2000a; Riahi and Roehrl 2000a, Morita,
Nakicenovic and Robinson, 2000) scenarios.1 Therefore, it contains a wide range of
energy technology developments based on assessments of two large writing teams and
expert reviews that were involved in the two scenario development processes with the
same basic modeling approach. Presumably, the scenarios thus contain a comprehensive
set of alternative but nevertheless comparable technological developments. Here we
analyze technological developments across 34 different scenarios from the IIASA-WEC
and IPCC studies.
1 The IIASA-WEC scenarios were developed with six formal models and three databases integrated into the IIASA
modeling framework for scenario formulation and analysis (Nakicenovic, Grübler and McDonald, 1998). In addition to
MESSAGE, the set includes a model for formulation of main scenario driving forces simply called Scenario Generator,
a macroeconomic energy model 11R (Schrattenholzer and Schäfer, 1996), a regional air pollution impacts model
RAINS (Alcamo et al., 1990), a model for the assessment of greenhouse gas induced climate change, MAGICC
(Wigley et al., 1997) and a basic linked system of national agricultural models, BLS (Fischer et al. 1988). The IPCC
SRES scenarios were developed by six different integrated models, the IIASA MESSAGE model and the associated
IIASA modeling framework constituting one of the six approaches (Nakicenovic et al., 2000a). The Post-SRES
scenarios were developed by three additional modeling frameworks resulting in a total of nine integrated models
(Morita, Nakicenovic and Robinson, 2000).
3Technological Change
There are two basic forms of technological change in energy scenarios. First,
technologies change incrementally over the time horizon. This means that from one to
another time period in the model some technology characteristics gradually improve or
not. Examples of possible improvements are reduction of costs, improvement of
efficiency and reduction of emissions per unit activity. The second form is more radical
and represents an introduction of completely new technologies at some future points in
time. Examples are fusion energy or carbon sequestration from fossil energy sources and
storage.
This is quite consistent with the literature on technological change. Schumpeter (1935)
was the first student of technology to distinguish these two basic types of change. The
main difference of the Schumpetarian approach with respect to energy scenarios is that
technological change is usually treated deterministically in any given scenario. The
technology is simply assumed to become available by a certain time period with a given
cost and performance whereas in reality it is an uncertain evolutionary process. Some
technologies become successful while others fail and their costs and performance are
functions of many interacting factors. This is the reason for taking a set of scenarios from
the literature and assessing the consequences of different directions of technological
change across them. As previously mentioned, the basic assumption is that the range will
encompass much of the inherent uncertainty through the richness of alternative futures.
Another important feature of technological change is that it is cumulative. Small changes
are amplified into fundamental ones as new, successful technologies become adopted and
diffuse replacing the older alternatives. For example, new technologies are often more
costly and inferior in some ways compared to the older and more “mature” alternatives
that dominate the market. However, they often improve as experience is gained by
producers (learning-by-doing) and consumers (learning-by-using). Costs and
environmental impacts are reduced while other aspects of technology performance are
usually also improved. Generally, performance improves. Such gradual and persistent
improvements are sometimes correlated with cumulative experience and are referred to
collectively as “increasing returns”. Empirical relationships between performance
improvement or costs reduction with increasing cumulative output or capacity are called
“experience” or “learning” curves in the literature. Figure 1 shows such a cost-reduction
learning curve for ethanol production from biomass in Brazil.
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Figure 1. Learning curve for ethanol production in Brazil compared with world oil prices. Source:
Grübler, personal communication, based on data from Goldemberg 1996.
Figure 1 shows that the costs of ethanol have declined with increases in cumulative
production and are now close to the price levels of crude oil. However, when ethanol was
first introduced in the early 1970s after the first oil-price shock, its cost was more than
three times that of oil. Through technological improvements and increases in the scale of
production, the prices have declined to such an extent that even the relatively low oil
prices since 1986 have not been much lower that those of ethanol during the last few
years. Figure 1 shows that the future of the process is uncertain and that there is no
guarantee that similar rate of improvement can be realized with further expansion of
ethanol production. The difference between the ethanol and oil prices gives an indication
of the extent to which methanol needed to be “subsidized” to be competitive. These
subsidies were borne in some manner by all agents involved, producers, consumers and
the government. It remains to be seen whether biomass in the form of liquid fuels will
reach competitiveness in the future with oil products, indicating the high degree of
uncertainty inherent in any process of technological change and the risk borne by
entrepreneurs and the public alike during the early phases of technological diffusion.
Figure 2 shows learning curves of three different energy technologies on logarithmic
scale indicating similar rates of learning. The lowest curve shows natural gas turbines that
in the early 1960s were more expensive than some other energy technologies at the time.
With increases in their application and from learning from aeronautical jet engines for
commercial and military aviation, costs declined approximately 20 percent per doubling
of cumulative installed capacity. As the result of these developments, the costs have
declined so much during the last three decades that today gas turbines offer the cheapest
way of generating electricity wherever natural gas is available (i.e., gas grids or LNG
terminals exist). The other two electricity generating technologies, windmills and
photovoltaics, are not generally competitive due to relatively high capital costs except in
some important niche markets. However, they are improving at approximately the same
rates as gas turbines did, offering the possibility of becoming cost-competitive assuming
further applications and extensive deployment. Windmills are likely to reach this position
first, and then photovoltaics, assuming that other competing technologies do not improve
sufficiently to maintain their current cost advantage. Clearly, any breakthrough in
5technologies could of course alter any of these future possibilities. Such considerations
also need to take into account the intermittent nature of wind and sunshine, requiring
special energy storage devices if capacity to meet base load requirements is to be
satisfied. To an extent, these other technology characteristics are also considered in
energy models (and not merely the costs) but on a quite coarse scale. For example, the
capacity factors and the load curves are presented indicating availability of various
technologies in an abstract manner and storage technologies are also included.
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Figure 2. Three learning curves for electricity generation technologies showing historical
reduction of costs with increasing scale of installations for gas turbines, windmills and
photovoltaics. Source: Nakicenovic, Grübler and McDonald, 1998.
The cost reductions of new technologies through the learning or experience curves are
very difficult to capture in standard energy and economic models. Such mathematical
problems are “non-convex” meaning that the usual methods of solving energy models do
not work. In particular, cost reductions with increases of installed capacity translate into a
downward sloping cost curves so that traditional methods do not lead to an equilibrium
between supply and demand. This means that the more technology is used the cheaper it
becomes while in standard modeling approaches the increasing costs with increasing
capacity assure an existence of a stable equilibrium. Consequently, technological learning
and other aspects of increasing returns in general are very difficult to capture in standard
energy and economic models even though it is an important aspect of technological
change in general.- The first attempts to introduce technological learning in energy
models have indicated that this invariably either leads to more complex mathematical
formulations or to relatively simple and limited applications. MESSAGE model was first
to be extended to generate the more complex forms of technological change (e.g. Messner
et al., 1996; Messner, 1997; Gritsevskyi and Nakicenovic, 2000). Later, similar
extensions were also included in the MARKAL model to account for technological
6learning (Mattsson, 1997). The IIASA-WEC and IPCC scenarios do not capture explicitly
the effects of increasing returns or learning curves due to difficulties in overcoming the
mathematical challenges previously mentioned. Instead, these scenarios include capacity,
cost and performance “constraints” and assumptions that collectively emulate the effects
of increasing returns. This way they include deterministic effects of gradual or
incremental technological change once a fundamentally new technology is assumed to
have been introduced in a given scenario.
Energy Systems
Energy scenarios are developed by capturing simplified energy systems in models. The
34 scenarios analyzed here encompass all relevant stages of energy conversion,
transformation and transport, from energy resources all the way to provision of energy
services. Energy imports and exports such as crude oil, oil products or electricity are
grouped below “resources” and below “final” category, respectively. Figure 3 illustrates
schematically the basic energy system structure as implemented in the scenarios. It shows
how individual technologies are connected to each other through their inputs and outputs
and across different stages of energy conversion, transformation, transport and end use.
Only some selected, representative technologies are shown in this schematic illustration.
They nevertheless illustrate all important energy chains. Technologies and connections
among them shown in black represent the “1990 technologies” and reference energy
system for the base year (1990 in all 34 scenarios). The technologies and their
connections marked in red are assumed to become available by 2020. For example, there
are many possible primary energy sources (and import possibilities) for electricity
generation in 1990 with new technologies becoming available by 2020. Also a number of
sources of hydrogen production become available by 2020 such as steam reforming of
natural or coal synthesis gases, electrolysis of water through all sources of electricity and
finally there is also a possibility of “blending” energy gases into one energy carrier. All
technologies in the energy system are associated with a number of characteristics such as
energy inputs and outputs, capital and operational costs, facility lifetimes, emissions of
various types per unit activity, maximum possible penetration rates and first startup time.
The MESSAGE model is an optimization framework. All of the 34 scenarios assessed
here were developed by MESSAGE through minimizing the total systems costs under the
constraints imposed on the energy system - such as fossil energy resources, renewable
energy potentials, the earliest date new technologies are assumed to be available, the
highest rates of market penetration, etc. Given this information and other scenario
features such as the demand for energy services, the model configures the evolution of
the energy system from the base year to the end of the time horizon (in ten year steps). It
provides the installed capacities of technologies, energy outputs and inputs, energy
requirements at various stages of the energy systems, costs, emissions, etc.
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Figure 3. Schematic diagram of the basic energy system structure in the MESSAGE model.
Further information about the IIASA modeling framework and the MESSAGE model is
given in Nakicenovic, Grübler and McDonald, 1998; Riahi and Roehrl, 2000b. The
individual models used in the framework include the Scenario Generator (Nakicenovic,
Grübler and McDonald, 1998), the MESSAGE (Messner and Strubegger, 1995), the
macroeconomic models MACRO (Manne and Richels, 1992; Messner and
Schrattenholzer, 2000), the climate model MAGICC (Wigley and Raper, 1997) and
several databases, including the CO2DB (Messner and Strubegger, 1991).
Here, we use the set of 34 scenarios to determine which of the technologies play
important roles across the range of scenarios in the future, and which are limited to some
specific scenario variants. The scenarios are based on very different assumptions about
energy demand, future technology characteristics, resource availability, etc. - providing a
rich diversity of alternative futures. Thus, technologies that appear to be invariant across
this wide range of scenarios can be considered to be robust and resilient with respect to
different assumptions. An example of invariant technology is electric transmission lines
as they are required in every scenario, and an example of specific technology used only in
some scenarios is carbon dioxide storage that is not part of a model solution due to the
higher costs unless future carbon emissions are limited in some way. It should be
mentioned that carbon removal and storage costs are expected to fall as production
capacities and experience with these technologies expands. However, carbon capture and
storage are likely to remain to be associated with additional and higher costs than similar
8energy systems with free release of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere thus making
carbon-control technologies a specific feature of mitigation scenarios.
Box 1: Descriptions of technologies and name abbreviations. Note that technology
efficiencies improve over time in most of the scenarios, but that plant life and plant
factors do not change.
Abbreviation Technology Description
Coal Std Aggregation of various types of traditional (single steam cycle) coal
power plants. These include plant types without FGD and DENOX, but
also other types with FGD up to 90 percent and DENOX up to 50
percent. Some potential for district heat co-generation. Efficiencies for
the model base year (1990) range between 38 and 40 percent. Plant life
is 30 years and plant factor (availability of utilization) 65 percent.
IGCC Integrated (coal) gasification combined cycle with 99 percent FGD and
DENOX. Some potential for co-generation. Initial efficiency in the base
year (1990) is 43 percent plant life is 30 years and plant factor 65
percent.
Oil ppl Aggregation of various types of oil power plants (includes e.g., Rankine
cycle with low NOx emissions and 90 percent DENOX, but also light oil
fueled engine plants). Some potential for co-generation. Initial efficiency
in the base year (1990) ranges between 40 and 46 percent, plant life is 30
years, plant factor 65 percent.
Gas Std Standard natural gas power plant (Rankine cycle) with district heat co-
generation. Initial efficiency in the base year (1990) is 40 percent, plant
life is 30 years and, plant factor 65 percent.
GCC Natural gas combined cycle power plant including some potential for co-
generation. Initial efficiency in the base year (1990) is 50 percent, plant
life is 30 years and plant factor 65percent.
GCC 0C Natural gas combined cycle power plant with zero carbon emissions.
CO2 is assumed to be re-injected in gas or oil fields (e.g., for enhanced
recovery). Efficiency loss due to re-injection (compared to GCC) about 1
percent. Plant life is 30 years and plant factor 65 percent.
Coal FC Coal based high temperature fuel cell. Efficiency is 50 percent, plant life
25 years and plant factor 65 percent. It is assumed in most of the
scenarios that this technology will be available commercially after 2010.
Gas FC High temperature fuel cell powered by natural gas. Rejected heat is
available for co-generation. Efficiency is 60 percent, plant life 25 years
and plant factor 65 percent. It is assumed in most of the scenarios that
this technology will be available commercially after 2010.
Waste Standard municipal waste power plant (Rankine cycle) with 90 percent
FGD and 50 percent DENOX. Initial efficiency in the base year (1990)
is 29 percent, plant life is 30 years and plant factor 65 percent.
9Bio STC Biomass power plant (single steam cycle) with some potential for district
heat co-generation. Initial efficiency in the base year (1990) is 29
percent, plant life is 30 years and plant factor 65 percent.
Bio GTC Biomass gasification power plant. Initial efficiency in the base year
(1990) is 46 percent, plant life is 25 years and plant factor 65 percent.
Nuc LC Low-cost conventional nuclear power plant (light and heavy water
reactor) . Initial efficiency in the base year (1990) is 30 percent, plant
life is 30 years and plant factor 70 percent.
Nuc HC High-cost conventional nuclear power plant (light and heavy water
reactor). Initial efficiency in the base year (1990) is 35 percent, plant
life is 30 years and plant factor 75 percent.
Nuc
HTR&FBR
Aggregation of various types of advanced nuclear power plants
including high temperature and fast breeder reactors with some potential
for district heat and hydrogen co-generation. Initial efficiency ranges
between 40 and 45 percent. Plant life is 30 years and plant factor 75
percent.
Hydro Aggregation of various types of hydroelectric power plants. Low and
high cost plants are distinguished in all scenarios in order to reflect the
influence of different sites and other factors on the plant costs. Plant life
is 60 years and plant factor 50 percent.
Solar Th Solar thermal power plant with storage and some potential for district
heat and hydrogen co-generation. Plant life is 25 years and plant factors
differ significantly across world regions ranging from 10 to 50 percent.
Solar PV Aggregation of various types of solar photovoltaic power generation
including large-scale power plants and small-scale onsite electricity
production. Plant life is 25 years and plant factors differ significantly
across world regions ranging from 10 to 50 percent.
Wind Wind turbine power plant. Plant life is 25 years and plant factor 25
percent.
Geothrm Geothermal power plant. Plant life is 30 years and plant factor 70
percent.
H2FC Aggregation of types of hydrogen fuel cells for industrial and residential
use with some potential for district heat co-generation. (Note that
explicit assumptions for investment costs are not part of the MESSAGE
model for all end-use technologies including these types of hydrogen
fuel cells. Consequently, it was not possible to include the H2FC fuel
cells in the comparison of investment costs.)
Energy and Emissions Scenarios
The set of 34 scenarios includes six developed jointly by IIASA and WEC (Nakicenovic,
Grübler and McDonald, 1998), nine developed for the IPCC (the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change) Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (Nakicenovic et al., 2000a)
and 19 scenarios developed for the IPCC Third Assessment Report (Riahi and Roehrl,
2000a, 2000b; Morita et al., 2001). This third group of 19 scenarios is different as it
10
consists of carbon dioxide emissions mitigation and stabilization scenarios. They include
more rapid diffusion of technologies with low and no carbon emissions such as carbon
sequestration from fossil energy sources and storage. This is achieved through different
policy measures such as cumulative emissions limits. It should be noted that this third
group of scenarios represents more than half of the total considered here and thus has an
over-proportional bearing on many of features of the whole scenario set.
Global Energy Perspectives
IIASA and WEC earlier undertook a five-year study on “Global Energy Perspectives”
(Nakicenovic, Grübler and McDonald, 1998). The study centered on three cases of future
social, economic and technological development for 11 world regions. The three cases
unfolded into six scenarios of energy systems alternatives. Together, they span a wide
range of alternative future developments and scenario driving forces. The three cases are
designated as Cases A, B, and C. Case A includes three scenario variants and reflects a
high-growth future in terms of vigorous economic development and rapid technology
improvement. Case B represents a middle course, with intermediate economic growth and
more modest technology improvement. Case C is ecologically driven and achieves
sustainable development in the world, incorporating challenging policies to
simultaneously protect the environment and enhance interregional and intergenerational
equity in two scenario variants (Riahi et al. 2001). Both scenarios lead to lower energy
use but high overall growth, especially in the South. Table 1 gives an overview of the
three cases and their six scenarios of energy systems development.
Table 1: IIASA-WEC Scenarios. The three cases unfold into six scenarios of energy systems
alternatives, three Case A scenarios (A1, ample oil and gas; A2, return to coal; and A3, non-fossil
future), a single Case B scenario (middle course), and two Case C scenarios (C1, new renewables;
and C2, renewables and new nuclear). Source: Nakicenovic, Grübler and McDonald, 1998.
Population
[billion]
Global Gross
Domestic
Product (GDP)
[trillion
(1990)US$]
Primary
Energya
[EJ]
Cumulative
CO2
Emissions
[GtC]
Atmospheric
CO2
Concentration
[ppmv]
2050 2100 2050 2100 2050 2100 1990-2100 2100
WEC-A1 10.1 11.7 100 300 1048 1895 1441 650
WEC-A2 10.1 11.7 100 300 1048 1896 1632 748
WEC-A3 10.1 11.7 100 300 1040 1859 1072 550
WEC-B 10.1 11.7 75 200 837 1464 1139 585
WEC-C1 10.1 11.7 75 220 601 881 635 445
WEC-C2 10.1 11.7 75 220 601 880 622 445
a Primary energy is calculated with the substitution equivalent method.
b Sulfur emissions include energy related emissions only.
c Assuming a climate sensitivity of 2.5oC.
In all scenarios, economic development outpaces the increase in energy, leading to
substantial reductions of energy intensities. As individual technologies progress, and as
inefficient technologies are retired in favor of more efficient ones, the energy intensity
decreases. In the six scenarios, improvements in individual technologies were varied
across a range derived from historical trends and current literature about future
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technology characteristics. Combined with the economic growth patterns of the scenarios,
the overall global average energy intensity reductions vary from about 0.8 percent per
year to a high figure of 1.4 percent per year during the 21st century. These figures bracket
the historical rate experienced by industrialized countries during the last hundred years,
of approximately one percent per year, and cumulatively lead to substantial energy
intensity decreases across the six scenarios. They also cover most of the range of energy
intensity improvements from the scenario database (see Nakicenovic, Grübler and
McDonald, 1998). Efficiency improvements are significantly higher in some regions,
especially over shorter periods of time.
In addition to the energy intensity improvements, the rates of technological change and
availability of energy resources also vary in a consistent manner across the scenarios. For
example, the high rates of economic growth are associated with rapid technological
advance, ample resource availability, and high rates of energy intensity improvement.
Conversely, low rates of economic growth result in a more limited expansion of energy
resources, lower rates of technological innovation in general, and lower rates of reduction
in energy intensities.
According to the median demographic projections, the world population is likely to
double by the middle of the next century as economic development continues, reaching
something less than 12 billion by the year 2100 (Bos and Vu, 1994). This demographic
development is representative of most of the central or median population projections
(Lutz, 1996; UN, 1998) leading to about 10 billion people in the world by 2100. The
IIASA-WEC scenarios combine one such central population projection with other
developments that vary across the six scenarios. For example, there is a three to fivefold
increase in world economic output by 2050 and a 10 to 15-fold increase by 2100. This
also implies that by 2100 the per capita incomes in most of the currently developing
countries will have reached levels characteristic of the developed countries today, making
current distinctions between the two groups of countries obsolete. The global primary
energy requirements grow less than economic output in all six scenarios, because of
improvements in energy intensities. The IIASA-WEC study envisages a 1.5 to 3-fold
increase in primary energy use by 2050, and a two to fivefold increase by 2100. The six
scenarios are grouped into three different cases of primary energy consumption and
economic development covering a wide range of alternative developments.
The scenarios span six different energy supply possibilities, from a tremendous expansion
of coal production to strict limits on it, from a phase-out of nuclear energy to a substantial
increase in its use, from carbon emissions in 2100 that are only one-third of today's levels
to emission increases of more than a factor of three. Yet, for all the variations explored in
the alternative scenarios, all manage to match the likely continuing push by consumers
for more flexible, more convenient, and cleaner forms of energy. This means that all
energy is increasingly transformed and converted into quality carriers such as electricity,
liquids, and energy gases. For example, the direct use of solids by final consumers
disappears by 2050.
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Alternative structures of future energy systems are capable of meeting these stringent
demands for higher-quality energy end use and services. Despite all the variations, the
scenarios look quite similar through 2020, and all still rely on fossil fuels. However, after
2020 the scenarios start to diverge. Some become coal intensive, like the high-growth
Scenario A2, others are more renewable and nuclear intensive, like Scenario A3 and the
two ecologically driven Scenarios (C1 and C2). All of them eventually lead to a partial
shift from fossil fuels to other sources of energy; however they follow alternative
development paths. As the paths spread out, they form diverging future developments. To
some extent they are mutually exclusive.2
Special Report on Emissions Scenarios
Over three years of work by an international writing team of some 50 scientists and
experts culminated in the publication of the Special Report on Emissions Scenarios
(SRES) by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). The SRES report
(Nakicenovic et al., 2000a) covers what is widely believed to be the full range of
demographic, socio-economic and technological driving forces for future emissions of
greenhouse gases (GHG) and other radiatively active gases, such as sulfur dioxide (SO2),
carbon monoxide (CO), nitrogen oxides (NOX), and describes a set of 40 resulting
emissions scenarios for the 21st century. The scenarios are based on an extensive
literature assessment, six alternative modeling approaches, and an “open process” that
solicited worldwide participation and feedback.
The scenarios indicate that the future development of energy systems will play a central
role in determining future emissions and suggests that technology is at least as important
a driving force as demographic change and economic development, and that all of the
driving forces influence not only CO2 emissions but also the emissions of other GHGs.
The scenarios illustrate that similar future GHG emissions can result from very different
socio-economic developments, and that similar developments in driving forces can
nonetheless result in widely different future emissions. Thus, the SRES reveals many
continuing uncertainties that climate research and policy analysis must take into account.
In particular, the report cautions against the use of single “best guess” or “business as
usual” scenarios and instead recommends the use of multiple baselines to reflect
uncertainty. It also puts technology policy in the forefront of possible response strategies
in a warming world, although the uncertainties imply that traditional cost/benefit and cost
minimization approaches are no longer appropriate. This is one of the reasons why SRES
scenarios can be used to assess the role of energy technologies across alternative future
developments. They were purposefully designed to cover a wide range of main driving
forces including energy technologies.
2 These scenarios do not, of course, incorporate all possible ”surprises” and contingencies, for the reasons
stated in the Introduction. They do, however, encompass a wide range of future possibilities.
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The SRES scenarios do not map all possibilities, but indicate general tendencies, with an
uncertainty range consistent with the underlying literature. There is no "business-as-
usual" scenario because the future is inherently unpredictable. Instead, large uncertainties
are associated with future emissions across the scenarios. For instance, carbon dioxide
emissions in a low population scenario of seven billion by 2100 range from less than five
to almost 40 GtC (giga or billion tons of carbon). Also, as mentioned earlier, alternative
combinations of main scenario driving forces can lead to similar levels of GHG
emissions.
The SRES team created four different narrative storylines and associated scenario
families; each describes a different world evolving through the twenty-first century and
each may lead to quite different greenhouse gas emissions trajectories. The storylines and
scenario families are:
• A1: a future world of very rapid economic growth, global population that peaks mid-
century and declines thereafter, and rapid introduction of new and more efficient
technologies. Major underlying themes are economic and cultural convergence and
capacity building, with a substantial reduction in regional differences in per capita
income. The A1 scenario family develops into three groups that describe alternative
directions of technological change in the energy system: fossil intensive (A1FI), non-
fossil energy sources (A1T), and a balance across all sources (A1B).
• A2: a differentiated world. The underlying theme is self-reliance and preservation of
local identities. Fertility patterns across regions converge very slowly, resulting in
continuously increasing population. Economic development is primarily regionally
orientated and per capita economic growth and technological change more fragmented
and slower than other storylines.
• B1: a convergent world with rapid change in economic structures towards a service
and information economy, reductions in material intensity and introduction of clean
technologies. The emphasis is on global solutions to economic, social and
environmental sustainability, including improving equity, but without additional
climate change policies. Consequently, all scenarios of the B1 family (B1, B1T, B1G)
depict alternative directions of technological change striving toward the achievement
of sustainable development paths (Riahi et al., 2001).
• B2: a world in which the emphasis is on local solutions to economic, social, and
environmental sustainability. It is a world with continuously increasing global
population at a rate lower than A2, intermediate levels of economic development, and
less rapid and more diverse technological change than for A1 and B1 storylines.
While the scenario is also oriented toward environmental protection and social equity,
it focuses on local and regional levels.
The features summarized above were quantified using six different models, resulting in a
number of alternative greenhouse gas profiles. In all 40 scenarios were quantified, and 35
included estimates for the full range of gases required for use by climate models. One
representative of each scenario family was then selected to provide four “marker”
scenarios (A1B, A2, B1 and B2) and another two scenarios were also selected later to
illustrate the other two scenario groups (A1FI and A1T), jointly covering 95 percent of
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the range of the full set of scenarios. These six scenarios are designated as illustrative of
the full set of 40 scenarios developed during the process The SRES writing team
recommended that at least these six illustrative scenarios be used in scientific and policy
assessments to reflect uncertainty ranges.
Compared to the IPCC IS92 scenarios (Leggett et al., 1992), the recent global population
projections are generally lower and this is reflected in SRES scenarios. Table 2
summarizes the main features of the nine IIASA scenarios developed for SRES.
A1 and B1 scenario families share a low population projection that leads to an initial
increase to some nine billion people by the middle of the century and declines to seven
billion by 2100. B2 family is based on a median population projection of about ten billion
people by 2100, slightly lower than the single global population projections shared by the
six IIASA-WEC scenarios (leading to about 12 billion by 2100). Finally, A2 family of
scenarios is based on a high population projection of 15 billion people by 2100.
Table 2: IIASA SRES Scenarios. The four SRES scenario families include nine greenhouse gas
emissions scenarios developed by the IIASA modeling framework. The four A1 scenarios (A1B,
balanced technology; A1C and A1G, fossil intensive; and A1T, rapid technological change), a
single A2 scenario (coal intensive), a single B2 scenario (dynamics as usual), and three B1
scenarios (B1, balanced technology; B1G, fossil intensive; and B1T, rapid technological change).
The full SRES set consists of 40 scenarios developed with six different modeling frameworks.
Source: Nakicenovic et al. 2000.
Population
[billion]
Global Gross
Domestic
Product (GDP)
[trillion
(1990)US$]
Primary
Energya
[EJ]
Cumulative
CO2
Emissions
[GtC]
Atmospheric
CO2
Concentration
[ppmv]
2050 2100 2050 2100 2050 2100 1990-2100 2100
SRES-A1B 8.7 7.1 187 550 1422 2681 1562 724
SRES-A1C 8.7 7.1 187 550 1377 2325 2046 950
SRES-A1G 8.7 7.1 187 550 1495 2737 2092 891
SRES-A1T 8.7 7.1 187 550 1213 2021 1122 560
SRES-B1 8.7 7.1 136 328 837 755 842 486
SRES-B1G 8.7 7.1 166 350 911 1157 902 509
SRES-B1T 8.7 7.1 136 328 819 714 776 464
SRES-B2 9.4 10.4 110 235 869 1357 1143 603
SRES-A2 11.3 15.1 82 243 1014 1921 1662 783
a Primary energy is calculated with the direct equivalent method.
b Sulfur emissions include also non-energy related emissions.
c Assuming a climate sensitivity of 2.5oC.
The SRES scenarios cover a wider range of driving forces and in particular of energy and
land-use structures. All SRES scenarios describe futures that are more affluent than
today, and a narrowing of relative income differences among world regions is assumed in
many of the scenarios. Global economic output increases from more than three times in
the lowest scenarios to more than 20 times in the highest cases. Convergence of regional
per capita incomes can lead to either high or low GHG emissions.
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Compared to the previous IPCC scenarios (the IS92 set, Leggett et al., 1992) GHG and
SO2 emissions in the SRES scenarios are generally lower and cover a wider range of
driving forces and emissions consistent with the underlying literature. Again it needs to
be stressed that the SRES scenarios do not seek to encompass all “surprises” and
contingencies, and there is a huge future research agenda for how far future societal and
environmental priorities could influence individual values and lifestyles, political
platforms and policies. But the SRES scenarios are more in line with the ranges of
IIASA-WEC scenarios. Global CO2 emissions from energy range from 3.3 to 37 GtC by
2100 compared to 6 GtC in 1990 and from land-use changes from a sink of 2.5 GtC to a
source of about 1.5 GtC by 2100 compared to a source of about 1 GtC estimated for 1990
(which is associated with a high degree of scientific uncertainty). Some of the energy and
many of the land-use emissions paths show trend reversals where initially emissions
increase, peak, and then gradually decline. Like CO2, the anthropogenic emissions of CH4
and N2O span a very wide range by 2100. SO2 emissions peak within the net few decades
and decrease until 2100 when they range from 11 to 83 MtS compared to some 76 MtS in
1990. These developments in the SRES scenarios lead to generally higher levels of
radiative forcing compared with the IS92 scenarios. Initial calculations of future climate
change by IPCC Third Assessment Report indicate that the SRES scenarios would result
in projected increases in global mean surface temperature of about 1.4 to 5.8 degrees
Centigrade by 2100 in contrast to the previous IPCC assessment (Second Assessment
Report) of 1 to 3.5 degrees Centigrade. These higher projections are primarily the result
of the lower projections of SO2 emissions, which tend to cool the climate, thus offsetting
the warming effect of GHG emissions. They are also due to higher radiative forcing of
GHGs in the climate models. About half of the uncertainty of the calculated climate
change range is due to the alternative trajectories of future emissions resulting from
SRES scenarios and the other half is due to the uncertainty of a given emissions trajectory
across a range of climate models used by IPCC.
Here we consider only nine scenarios developed by the MESSAGE model from the
whole set of 40 scenarios developed by six different modeling frameworks. The reasons
are that MESSAGE has also been used to develop the IIASA-WEC scenarios. This means
that the assumptions and other relevant scenario features are comparable across the two
studies. The more important reason is that MESSAGE is the only systems-engineering
model of the six used in SRES. Other models do not include the detail on technologies
needed for this analysis and comparison of the role of new and advanced technologies
across scenarios. Even the MESSAGE model, however, relies principally on an energy
supply technologies’ database, whereas technologies relating to end-uses and greater
efficiency are likely to be at least as important for future developments.3
3 Note that the modeling of technological changes in the end-use sector is particularly difficult, since it is not
exclusively economic thinking that drives the customers' choice for end-use devices. End users are willing to pay more
for more convenient and flexible energy forms, in contrast to companies in the supply sectors, which usually follow the
premise of profit maximization. Such real world imperfections are difficult to deal with in cost-optimization models
such as MESSAGE. Therefore, in MESSAGE the end-use technologies are included in a more stylized and generic way
considering so-called inconvenience costs (i.e., cost premiums in addition to the real costs of end-use technologies
expressing the willingness to pay for favored technologies)
16
Post-SRES Scenarios
The third set of scenarios considered here was also developed for the IPCC Third
Assessment Report (Morita, Nakicenovic and Robinson, 2000). They are based on the
SRES scenarios as baselines for the assessment of possible emissions mitigation
strategies, hence the name Post-SRES. In particular, the scenarios were developed to
understand better the nature and extent of mitigation measures and policies needed across
the four SRES scenarios families to achieve stabilization of atmospheric GHG
concentrations in the 22nd century. Four alternative stabilization levels of atmospheric
concentrations of CO2 (equivalent) were considered, 450 ppmv (parts per million
volume), 550 ppmv, 650 ppmv and 750 ppmv. This compares the current atmospheric
concentrations of about 368 ppmv and the pre-industrial concentrations of some 280
ppmv two centuries ago.
The Post-SRES scenarios are harmonized with their four SRES baselines with respect to
three key driving forces of future emissions: population development, economic growth
and final energy use. Other salient features of the four SRES scenario families were also
adopted for the Post-SRES mitigation scenarios.
The Post-SRES scenarios were developed by nine different modeling teams including the
six from the SRES scenarios. Most of the modeling teams analyzed more than two SRES
baseline scenarios, and half of them analyzed more than one stabilization case for at least
one of these baselines. In total, 50 Post-SRES scenarios were analyzed by the nine
different integrated modeling frameworks. The IIASA modeling framework that includes
the MESSAGE model was one of the nine used to develop Post-SRES scenarios. In total,
19 out of the 50 Post-SRES scenarios were developed by the MESSAGE model. The
main characteristics for the 19 Post-SRES scenarios developed by the MESSAGE model
are summarized in Table 3.
In order to reduce CO2 and other GHG emissions, each modeling team assumed specific
technology policy measures for their scenario quantification. These ranged from
emissions taxes and limits to introduction of zero-carbon energy options and carbon
sequestration through scrubbing, removal and storage. In the case of the MESSAGE
model, the CO2 mitigation measures included concentration limitations for the four
ceilings of 450, 550, 650 and 750 ppmv (Riahi and Roehrl, 2000). This resulted in an
endogenous choice of appropriate mitigation measures by the model from the above
portfolio of technologies.
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Table 3: IIASA Post-SRES Scenarios. The nine SRES scenario developed by the IIASA
modeling framework served as baselines for 19 stabilization scenarios. They include four A1B
(balanced technology) scenarios, five A1C (coal intensive), four A1G (gas and oil intensive), two
A1T (rapid technological change), three A2 scenarios (dynamics as usual), and one B2
(sustainable development) scenario. Four different atmospheric CO2 concentrations’ stabilization
of 450, 550, 650 and 750 ppmv (CO2 equivalent) are indicated next to the scenario’s name.
Source: Riahi and Roehrl, 2000a.
Population
[billion]
Global Gross
Domestic
Product (GDP)
[trillion
(1990)US$]
Primary
Energy
[EJ]
Cumulative
CO2
Emissions
[GtC]
Atmospheric
CO2
Concentration
[ppmv]
2050 2100 2050 2100 2050 2100 1990-2100 2100
A1B-450 8.7 7.1 187 550 1447 2707 701 450
A1B-550 (1) 8.7 7.1 187 550 1403 2691 1065 553
A1B-550 (2) 8.7 7.1 186 547 1339 2505 1052 550
A1B-650 8.7 7.1 187 550 1413 2681 1350 647
A1C-450 8.7 7.1 187 550 1429 2884 668 451
A1C-550 (1) 8.7 7.1 187 550 1346 2413 1005 548
A1C-550 (2) 8.7 7.1 185 541 1269 2188 1050 550
A1C-650 8.7 7.1 187 550 1331 2396 1312 639
A1C-750 8.7 7.1 187 550 1279 2258 1283 752
A1G-450 8.7 7.1 187 550 1562 2815 694 447
A1G-550 8.7 7.1 187 550 1485 2787 1060 551
A1G-650 8.7 7.1 187 550 1483 2787 1359 644
A1G-750 8.7 7.1 187 550 1486 2786 1658 752
A1T-450 8.7 7.1 187 550 1204 2077 703 455
A1T-550 8.7 7.1 187 550 1210 2020 1056 553
A2-550 11.3 15.1 81 236 959 1571 1077 550
A2-650 11.3 15.1 82 243 996 1810 1444 650
A2-750 11.3 15.1 81 238 992 1610 1396 750
B2-550 9.4 10.4 109 231 881 1227 949 550
a Assuming a climate sensitivity of 2.5oC.
An important result from these stabilization scenarios across all nine modeling
approaches is that the reductions from the four alternative scenarios families (different
worlds labeled A1, A2, B1 and B2) required different technology measures. Stabilization
from baselines with high emissions such as A2, but relatively low rates of economic
growth, is more difficult - especially for low concentrations ceilings - compared to
baselines with high rates of economic growth and low emissions such as B2 and some
variants of A1 (A1T). This again illustrates the important role of technology (or the
choices made among technology options) in determining the salient features of future
energy systems. Future worlds with high rates of economic growth and technological
innovations are better placed to reduce emissions in these stabilization scenarios and can
generally achieve these goals at lower costs. In addition, the choice of a particular
stabilization level from any given baseline significantly affects the technologies needed
for achieving the necessary emissions mitigation. For example, a wider range of
technological measures and their widespread diffusion is required for stabilizing at 450
ppmv compared with higher levels.
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It is also apparent from these scenarios that no single measure will be sufficient to
achieve stabilization at any given level. This means that the CO2 and other GHG
emissions cannot be reduced from baseline scenarios by any single technology. There is
no “silver bullet”. Instead, a portfolio of technologies needs to be developed and adopted
in addition to other social, behavioral and structural changes. Furthermore, the rates of
technological change required for achieving a given stabilization level are significantly
affected by the choice of development path over the 21st century. This is an important
finding. The nature of the development path itself has an important bearing on the
direction of technological change in the scenarios. For example, scenarios with lower
rates of technological change are more likely to rely heavily on coal while scenarios with
low energy demands coupled with high economic growth are more likely to rely more
heavily on renewable sources of energy. Several robust technology options emerge in the
case of the 19 Post-SRES stabilization scenarios developed by the MESSAGE model. In
particular, the electricity sector is not dominated by any single technology; however,
hydrogen, fuel cells and carbon sequestration are the most robust in stabilization cases
from all alternative baselines.
Scenario Comparisons
The 34 scenarios analyzed in this assessment encompass a wide range of future energy
use in the world and thus test the possible role of future energy technologies under
different circumstances. On one side of this range are scenarios with very high energy use
of up to six times current levels, and on the other scenarios with a high degree of energy
savings and conservation that cap future energy needs at less than twice the current use.
Clearly, scenarios with high energy use imply different energy technology portfolios
compared with scenarios that put emphasis on end-use energy savings and enhanced
performance of energy services.
Figure 4 shows the range of future primary energy use across the 34 scenarios. The
highest scenarios approach primary energy levels of 3,000 EJ while the lowest stay below
800 EJ by 2100. The six IIASA-WEC scenarios (labeled in black) share three levels of
primary energy use. The scenario range includes nine SRES and 19 Post-SRES scenarios.
The 28 IPCC SRES and Post-SRES scenarios overlap with the IIASA-WEC ones over
the lower range, but extend the upper part of the distribution considerably. This is
primarily due to the high rates of economic development in some of them. The Post-
SRES stabilization scenarios use SRES scenarios as baselines so that the primary energy
use levels are basically the same for each pair of the scenarios.
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Figure 4. Global primary energy use. The three cases of energy use are shown for the six IIASA-
WEC scenarios (labeled in black) and the range for the IPCC SRES scenarios developed by
IIASA. The Post-SRES stabilization scenarios use SRES scenarios as baselines so that the
primary energy requirements are basically the same for each pair of the scenarios. The range
includes nine SRES and 19 Post-SRES.
Different technological portfolios are used across these 34 scenarios for provision of the
required energy services. Thus, the structures of the energy systems are quite different in
general and even for scenarios that share similar energy requirements. Figure 5 illustrates
this indirectly by showing CO2 emissions. The six IIASA-WEC scenarios are shown
individually. The ranges are given for the IPCC SRES scenarios and the Post-SRES
stabilization scenarios developed by IIASA. The Post-SRES emissions stabilization
scenarios use SRES scenarios as baselines. SRES range includes nine and post SRES 19
IIASA scenarios. Three ranges are shown, SRES, overlap of SRES and Post-SRES and
Post-SRES.
The six IIASA-WEC scenarios span a wide range of emissions, from more than three
times current emission to less than half. The three A scenarios (A1, A2 and A3) that share
the high primary energy trajectory differ fundamentally in their CO2 emissions. The main
reason is different structures of the energy system as the result of alternative
technological developments. The highest emissions are associated with the A2 scenario,
which is coal intensive and represents a development path of relatively modest
development of alternative technologies. Consequently, there is a pervasive “return” to
coal as conventional oil and gas tend to be exhausted and because renewables continue to
be costly and difficult. In contrast, the A3 scenario leads to a pervasive diffusion of new
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energy technologies including both clean fossil fuels (particularly natural gas) as well as
renewables and nuclear. Thus, the emissions return to current levels by 2100 after
peaking during the mid-century. Scenario A1 is a “balanced” scenario with respect to the
development of new technologies and the continuing role of the old ones. Scenario B is
characterized by a quite similar energy system structure, but a lower, median economic
growth path. The emissions trajectory of scenario A3 is consistent with atmospheric
stabilization at 550 ppmv, indicating that technological change can lead to significant
emissions reductions without explicit mitigation measures and consequently also at “no
additional” cost. Finally, the two C scenarios that represent “ecologically driven” futures
lead to a fundamental shift away from fossil fuels in the energy system and radical
reduction of primary energy use in delivering needed energy services through
conservation and energy saving. In contrast, these two scenarios include carbon and
energy taxes that facilitate the shift away from fossil fuels and a reduction of energy
requirements. As a result, the CO2 emissions are impressively low and constant with a
stabilization at below 450 ppmv. Thus, together, the six scenarios cover most of the
possibilities of future technology mixes in the energy system, from coal-intensive to
renewable systems.
The nine IIASA SRES scenarios cover the lower range of IIASA-WEC scenarios but
extend the upper bound well above 30 GtC. The reasons for this wide range are similar to
those for the IIASA-WEC scenarios. The SRES A1 scenarios branch out into three
different paths of technological development, from coal-intensive futures to those with a
rapid shift toward non-fossil fuel and high efficiency technologies. These differences in
the technology base of the SRES A1 scenarios span the full range of future emissions,
from more than five times current ones (30 GtC) to less than half. Very high rates of
economic development and energy requirements (see Figure 4) are the main reason why
the SRES A1 scenarios greatly exceed the upper bound of the IIASA-WEC scenarios.
Other SRES scenarios are situated within the range of the A1 family. The differences
between their emissions trajectories are due in part to varying diffusion rates of new
technologies and in part due to different levels of economic and population growth.
As already mentioned, the IIASA Post-SRES scenarios use SRES cases as baselines. For
example, energy use is quite similar for each pair as well as other important driving
forces. As mentioned, the main difference is that Post-SRES scenarios limit the future
atmospheric GHG concentrations at four levels varying between 650 and 450 ppmv (CO2
equivalent). This affects the structure of the energy system in comparison to the baseline.
The change is greater the higher the need to mitigate emissions either because the
baseline emissions are high or because the stabilization level is low. Generally, mitigation
measures favor more efficient technologies, a shift toward decarbonization either through
higher shares of natural gas or introduction of carbon sequestration through scrubbing,
removal and storage, and a shift toward renewables and nuclear energy. The diffusion of
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Figure 5. Global carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. The six IIASA-WEC scenarios (labeled in
black) are shown individually. The ranges are given for the IPCC SRES scenarios and the Post-
SRES stabilization scenarios developed by IIASA. The Post-SRES emissions stabilization
scenarios use SRES scenarios as baselines. The SRES range includes nine and Post-SRES 19
scenarios. Three ranges are shown, SRES range, overlap of SRES and Post-SRES and Post-SRES
range.
carbon scrubbing, removal and storage technologies is one of the greatest differences
between Post-SRES scenarios and their SRES baselines. Carbon scrubbing and removal
are significant in most of Post-SRES scenarios. Some marginal deployment of these
technologies occurs both in IIASA-WEC A3 as well as in some SRES A1 scenarios. This
is not related to emissions mitigation but rather some use of these technologies become
economic because captured CO2 has a commercial value in these scenarios for enhanced
oil recovery. In contrast, Post-SRES scenarios lead to a wide diffusion of carbon
scrubbing and removal technologies.
Fossil Reserves and Resources Across the Scenarios
The perceptions about global energy resources have changed during the last decades. On
one side there is the traditional view that conventional energy reserves of oil and natural
gas are limited, say to some four to six decades at current consumption levels. However,
this is a static view of energy resources. A more dynamic view is that the future
availability of energy is to a large degree a function of energy technologies and economic
conditions. Historically, this has certainly been the case. Improvements in energy
technologies have reduced the adverse environmental impacts of energy at all scales and,
at the same time, have also increased the estimates and availability of energy sources. In a
way, the quantity of global fossil energy resources available to future generations can be
considered to be a growing endowment. However, resources are not an end in themselves
22
and their attractiveness must be seen in context with the energy service needs of our
societies, the technologies which convert different resources into energy services, and the
economics associated with their use, including environmental impacts. As technologies
improve, it becomes possible to economically assess and extract deeper, lower quality
and more remote deposits. In addition, the more speculative occurrences of fossil energy,
especially unconventional deposits of natural gas in form of hydrates, are truly vast and,
if ever exploited, could supply any conceivable future energy demands for centuries to
come.
Table 4 shows fossil energy reserves, resources and additional occurrences relative to
cumulative historical consumption and their use in 1988. It gives fossil energy deposits
divided into reserves, resources, the resource base and additional occurrences. Oil and gas
are divided into conventional and unconventional deposits. Reserves are known and are
recoverable with present technologies at prevailing market conditions. Resources are
occurrences in addition to reserves, with less certain geological assurance, or lacking
present economic feasibility, or both. Changing market conditions, innovation diffusion,
and advances in science can transform resources into reserves. Thus, the growth of
reserves can occur even without new resource discoveries. The resource base is the sum
of reserves and resources. It includes all potentially recoverable coal, conventional oil
and natural gas, unconventional oil resources (such as gas in shale, tar sands, and heavy
crude), and unconventional natural gas resources (such as gas in Devonian shale, tight
sand formations, geopressured aquifers, and coal seams). Additional occurrences are all
other hydrocarbon deposits that are known to exist but are associated with great
uncertainty about their extent, technology and economics of recovery. Methane hydrates
are an example of a clean and potentially enormous energy resource. Recent estimates
indicate that there might be three times more natural gas deposited in hydrates than in all
other hydrocarbon occurrences.
Table 4: Global hydrocarbon reserves, resources, and occurrences, in ZJ (1021J). Data sources:
Nakicenovic et al, 1996; Nakicenovic, Grübler and McDonald, 1998, WEC, 1998, Masters et al.,
1994; and Rogner et al., 2000.
Consumption Reserves Resources Resource Additional
1860–1998 1998 Base Occurrences
Oil
Conventional 4.85 0.13 6 6 12
Unconventional 0.29 0.01 6 16 22 60
Gas
Conventional 2.35 0.08 6 11 17
Unconventional 0.03 -- 9 26 35 800
Coal 5.99 0.09 21 179 200 140
Total 13.51 0.31 48 238 286 1000
Table 4 summarizes recent estimates from a number of literature sources and gives the
occurrences of oil, natural gas and coal derived from the literature (Nakiceonivic et al.,
1996; Nakicenovic, Grübler and McDonald, 1998, WEC, 1998, Masters et al., 1994; and
Rogner et al., 2000). The estimates were chosen so as to correspond to the highest
plausible values from the literature. They indicate that severe resource constraints can be
avoided even over time scales of centuries provided that the appropriate technological
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development actually takes place to render vast resources into economically exploitable
reserves. Given current oil and gas reserve-to-production ratios of some four decades, it is
obvious that the currently estimated reserves will be depleted long before the fossil
energy era is likely to come to an end. Thus, without the appropriate technological
development that leads to continuous transfer and reclassification of some resources into
reserves, the availability of oil and natural gas sources might indeed become limited
during 21st century.
Driven by economics, technological and scientific advances, and policy decisions, the
hydrocarbon resource base has expanded over time, and reserves have been continuously
replenished from resources and from new discoveries (Masters et al., 1994; Nakicenovic,
Grübler and McDonald, 1998; Rogner et al., 2000). Thus, it can be expected that the
hydrocarbon resource base is likely to expand and exceed the current estimates shown in
Table 4. Some deposits currently classified as occurrences will enter the resource base
and eventually become reserves. The argument then becomes more one of cost and
development of extraction, treatment and environmental mitigation technologies rather
than of ultimately available reserves (Gregory and Rogner, 1998).
Currently identified global fossil energy reserves are estimated at more than 48 ZJ
(48,000 EJ or about 1,160 Gtoe). This quantity is theoretically large enough to last more
than 150 years at the current level of global fossil energy consumption (310 EJ or 8.5
Gtoe in 1998), or is three and a half times larger than the total cumulative fossil energy
extraction since 1860. Coal accounts for more than half of all fossil energy reserves.
Nevertheless, even oil and gas reserves would last for about 120 years at current global
consumption levels.
Current estimates of fossil resources and additional occurrences are much larger but more
uncertain than reserves. The global resource base (reserves and resources) is estimated at
some 286 ZJ (6,900 Gtoe), with additional occurrences of more than 1000 ZJ (24,000
Gtoe), mostly in the form of methane hydrates. Thus, hydrocarbon energy sources are
abundantly available in the world and the known deposits are likely to last more than a
century, and with technological and scientific progress in energy extraction, many
centuries.
What is limited is conventional oil, currently the fuel of choice for most end uses,
especially transportation. Much of the abundant occurrences of hydrocarbons consist of
coal and unconventional oil and gas. Use of these sources of energy is associated with
adverse environmental impacts. As more difficult, lower quality and more remote
deposits are exploited, it can be expected that environmental impacts will increase unless
vigorous mitigation measures are enacted. In other words, what is limited are “clean and
easy” hydrocarbon deposits. Thus, improvements in efficiency and environmental
compatibility of energy technologies are important prerequisites for utilizing more
difficult hydrocarbon deposits.
This more dynamic view of energy resources is reflected both in the IIASA-WEC and
SRES scenarios where the availability of fossil energy sources is assumed to be a
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function of other relevant scenario characteristics such as the rates of technological
change and energy investments. Table 5 summarizes oil and gas reserves and resources
available across the scenarios. Coal is not shown in Table 5 as it is assumed to be
abundant and the future cumulative consumption levels do not come even close to the
quantities shown in Table 4. The main issue across the scenarios is which portion of the
oil and gas resources shown in Table 4 could be extrapolated in the future with close to
conventional methods and current prices and which portion would require the availability
of advanced and new technologies at competitive costs. As technologies improve and
market conditions change, some resources are in any case transferred (reclassified) into
what we consider to be the reserves. Another important development is that some of the
so-called unconventional sources of oil and gas are becoming competitive, such as the
extraction of methane from coal beds.
Table 5. Eight categories of conventional and unconventional oil and gas reserves, resources and
additional occurrences used in the 34 scenarios, in ZJ (1021J). Table shows which of the
categories are deployed in each scenario and compares cumulative use from 1990 to 2100 with
historical consumption from 1860 to 1988.
Conventional
reserves and
resources Unconventional
Unconventional
and additional
occurrences
Enhanced
recovery Recoverable
Category I,II,III IV V VI VII VIII Total
Historical
Consumption
1860-1998
Oil 12.4 5.8 1.9 14.1 24.6 35.2 94 5.1
Gas 16.5 2.3 5.8 10.8 16.2 800 852 2.4
Scenario/ Scenario assumptions
Consumption
1990-2100
Category I,II,III IV V VI VII VIII Oil Gas
SRES
A1B gas/oil gas/oil gas/oil gas/oil gas --- 25.5 31.8
A1T gas/oil gas/oil gas/oil gas/oil gas --- 20.8 24.9
A1O&G gas/oil gas/oil gas/oil gas/oil gas/oil gas 34.4 49.1
A1C gas/oil gas/oil gas/oil --- --- --- 18.5 20.5
A2 gas/oil gas/oil gas/oil gas --- --- 19.6 24.5
B1 gas/oil gas/oil gas gas --- --- 17.2 23.9
B2 gas/oil gas/oil gas/oil gas --- --- 19.4 26.9
WEC
A1 gas/oil gas/oil gas/oil gas/oil gas/oil gas/oil 34.0 28.9
A2 gas/oil gas/oil gas/oil --- --- --- 18.7 21.2
A3 gas/oil gas/oil gas gas gas --- 17.4 36.1
B gas/oil gas/oil gas/oil --- --- --- 17.8 19.6
C1 gas/oil --- --- --- --- --- 12.4 14.9
C2 gas/oil --- --- --- --- --- 12.4 14.2
Table 5 gives eight categories of oil and gas availability across all 34 scenarios and shows
which of the categories are actually used in the IIASA-WEC and SRES scenarios.
Figures 6a and 6b show the cumulative use of oil and gas, respectively, within each of the
eight categories across the 34 scenarios. Each “error bar” shows the range across for
IIASA, SRES and Post-SRES scenarios for a given category from the upper to the lower
bound and for the median. The IIASA-WEC scenarios are highlighted separately through
dashed bars, which also show the upper and lower bound as well as the median. Figures
6a and 6b also show in how many scenarios each of the eight categories is available, in
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percent on the right hand side. The first three categories in Table 5 and Figures 6a and 6b
constitute conventional oil and gas as given in Table 4. They are deployed in all
scenarios. The following three categories constitute unconventional oil and gas, divided
into what might be available in form of enhanced oil and gas recovery and
unconventional reserves and resources. The last two categories represent additional
occurrences. In case of oil only one scenario extends into the eight category but the
cumulative use is comparatively small with less than 0.5 ZJ as shown in Figure 6a. The
natural gas story is more complicated. Most of the occurrences in the seventh category
constitute more difficult unconventional gas resources while the eight category is
enormous constituting of vast quantities of methane hydrates. The challenge is to
understand the conditions and technologies that would make some of these quantities
available economically during the 21st century. The actual use of methane hydrates
(category eight) is more modest with about 25 ZJ in the most extreme scenario and with
more than 20 ZJ in the median case. However, 20 percent of all scenarios tap into
methane hydrates. Most of them are Post-SRES mitigation cases indicating that this
energy source might become more attractive due to its low carbon intensity in low
emissions futures.
0
3
6
9
12
I II III IV V VI VII VIII
World oil reserve and resource categories
Cu
m
u
la
tiv
e
o
il
u
se
(19
90
-
21
00
),Z
J
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Pe
rc
en
to
ft
o
ta
ls
ce
n
ar
io
sAll scenarios
WEC scenarios
Availability in the
scenarios (%)
Figure 6a. Cumulative oil use from 1990 to 2100 across 34 scenarios, in ZJ (1021J), for the eight
categories of conventional and unconventional oil reserves, resources and additional occurrences
used in the 34 scenarios. Each bar shows the range across IIASA SRES and Post-SRES scenarios
for a given technology from upper to lower bound and for the median. The IIASA-WEC
scenarios are highlighted separately through dashed bars, showing the upper and lower bound as
well as the median. Also shown on the right hand side is in how many scenarios each of the eight
categories is available, in percent.
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Figure 6b. Cumulative gas use from 1990 to 2100 across 34 scenarios, in ZJ (1021J), for the eight
categories of conventional and unconventional gas reserves, resources and additional occurrences
used in the 34 scenarios. Each bar shows the range across IIASA SRES and Post-SRES scenarios
for a given technology from upper to lower bound and for the median. The IIASA-WEC
scenarios are highlighted separately through dashed bars, showing the upper and lower bound as
well as the median. Also shown on the right hand side is in how many scenarios each of the eight
categories is available, in percent.
Generally, the first five categories are available in most scenarios. The main exceptions
are the two IIASA-WEC C scenarios that are limited to conventional oil and gas
categories. The last two categories of additional occurrences and more difficult
unconventional gas resources are available only in some scenarios with very rapid growth
such as more oil and gas intensive cases of SRES and Post-SRES A1 scenario family and
IIASA-WEC A1 and A3 scenarios. As the result the cumulative fossil energy use varies
over a wide range across the scenarios depending on the assumed availability of oil and
gas resources as well as other relevant scenario characteristics such as the rates of
technological change. Another important determinant of fossil energy deployment and
technology choice across the scenarios is the cost. As mentioned, MESSAGE is an
optimizing framework for determining the cost optimal structure of future energy
systems. Consequently, costs of fossil energy sources are crucial in determining energy
systems structures. Figures 7a and 7b show the evolution of shadow prices of oil and gas,
respectively, in the nine SRES scenarios. Shadow prices represent marginal costs, in this
case of oil and gas extraction. Scenarios with rapid rates of technological change expand
the access to oil and gas at relatively low marginal costs keeping the energy supply
options wide open while other scenarios with higher marginal costs of oil and gas evolve
toward a stronger reliance on coal and non-fossil energy sources.
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Figure 7a. Shadow price of oil in nine SRES scenarios, as index 2000=1.
0
2
4
6
20
00
20
10
20
20
20
30
20
40
20
50
20
60
20
70
20
80
20
90
21
00
Sh
ad
o
w
pr
ic
e
o
fn
at
u
ra
lg
as
(in
de
x,
20
00
=1
)
A1B
A1C
A1G
A1T
B1G
B1
B1T
A2
B2
Figure 7b. Shadow price of natural gas in nine SRES scenarios, as index 2000=1.
The differences in fossil energy requirements across the scenarios increase over the time
horizon leading to considerable divergence across the scenarios by the end of the century.
Table 6 summarizes these differences for oil and gas by showing consumption levels and
the reserves to production ratio in 2100. The oil and gas intensive scenarios are
characterized both through high consumption levels and high reserves to production
ratios. This indicates the dynamic nature of resources across the scenarios and their
timely transfer into reserves as time unfolds and technological and economic conditions
change. Table 5 shows variations in the cumulative use of oil and gas from 1990 to 2100
across the scenarios. The highest use of oil gas is in SRES A1C&G case with 34.4 ZJ of
oil and 49.1 ZJ of gas while the lowest is in IIASA-WEC C2 scenario with 12.4 ZJ of oil
and 14.2 ZJ of gas. Even the highest oil and gas use is well below the resource base given
in Table 5 meaning that in all scenarios much of the oil and gas will be left in the ground
by the end of the 21st century.
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Table 6. Oil and gas consumption, in EJ, and reserves-to-production ration, in years, in 2100
across the 34 scenarios.
Natural gas Oil
Consumption
(EJ/yr)
R/P ratio
(years)
Consumption
(EJ/yr)
R/P ratio
(years)
SRES scenario estimates for 2100
A1B 350 49 138 65
B1H 244 40 53 44
B1 215 49 45 55
B1T 166 81 48 54
A1G 1241 629 391 59
A1C 118 24 56 37
A1T 196 127 77 178
B2 337 38 52 38
A2 289 92 47 330
WEC scenario estimates for 2100
A1 452 1785 354 226
A2 130 23 73 31
A3 430 35 53 30
B 204 23 111 28
C1 89 14 44 11
C2 96 20 46 9
1990 estimates 72 58 139 43
The evolution of fossil energy resources utilization across scenarios can be easily
illustrated in the context of total energy requirements. Figure 8 shows fossil energy
requirements across 34 scenarios against total final energy requirements. The 45 degree
line indicates a hypothetical situation where each increment in final energy requirements
is met through a proportional amount of fossil energy conversion into final energy. In
other words, the structure of primary energy consumption would remain unchanged and
any final energy demand increase would be divided equally across fossil and non-fossil
primary sources. It is noteworthy that the trajectories of most of the 34 scenarios are
situated below the 45 degree line. This means that considerable decarbonization takes
place in most of the scenarios. There is a noticeable divergence among the trajectories as
final energy requirements increase with the passage of time. The differences are
especially pronounced for scenarios that surpass 1 ZJ total annual final energy demand.
Some of them pass through a maximum level reaching peak fossil energy requirements
and than proceed toward faster rates of decarbonization. Three of the IIASA-WEC
scenarios indicate similar degrees of decarbonization even at lower levels of final energy
demand between 0.5 and 1 ZJ per year. Figure 8 indicates most explicitly that the
scenario dynamics are not driven by fossil energy scarcities but rather by other scenario
driving forces, such as the rates of technological change, that shape both the availability
of fossil and other energy sources to future generations.
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Figure 8. Fossil energy requirements and final energy demand across 34 scenarios, in EJ per year.
The dashed line indicates a hypothetical situation where additional final energy demand is
fulfilled in the same proportion from fossil and non-fossil primary energy sources.
Production of Synthetic Fuels Across the Scenarios
Figure 9 shows the ranges of synfuels production by deployed technology across
scenarios. Figure 9a shows the ranges for 2020, Figure 9b for 2050 and Figure 9c for
2100. The first four technologies from left to the right produce synthetic liquids from
coal, biomass and natural gas, while the next eight technologies produce synthetic gases
from coal, biomass, solar, nuclear and various sources of electricity. Each “error bar”
shows the range across IIASA, SRES and Post-SRES scenarios for a given technology
from the upper to the lower bound and for the median. The IIASA-WEC scenarios are
highlighted separately through dashed bars, which also show the upper and lower bound
as well as the median. The main reason for substantially lower ranges for the six IIASA-
WEC scenarios is that they have a lower span of energy use, especially when compared
to some of the high demand (e.g. SRES A1 family) scenarios. In addition, more than half
of the 34 scenarios are mitigation and stabilization cases which ceteris paribus would
lead to higher deployment of low and zero-carbon energy carriers such as electricity and
hydrogen. This is indeed reflected by a trend toward higher production of hydrogen
initially from natural gas and increasingly from renewables and nuclear.
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Figure 9a. Ranges of synthetic liquids and gases production across scenarios EJ per year for 2020.
Each bar shows the range across IIASA SRES and Post-SRES scenarios for a given technology
from upper to lower bound and for the median. The IIASA-WEC scenarios are highlighted
separately through dashed bars, showing the upper and lower bound as well as the median.
Initially hydrogen is produced from natural gas and to a lesser degree by zero-carbon
energy sources, nuclear and solar. The production is substantial by 2020 (Figure 8a) in
some scenarios reaching up to 20 EJ per year of hydrogen produced by natural gas and up
to more than 10 EJ per year by nuclear and solar each. Average production across all
scenarios is quite low. Only the median of hydrogen from natural gas reaches significant
levels of almost 10 EJ per year. By 2050 (Figure 8b) hydrogen production from natural
gas increases five-fold in the highest scenarios with the median in the region of some 25
EJ per year. Solar hydrogen increases even more rapidly in the highest scenarios with
more than 150 EJ per year but the median is very low and comparable to the medians of
other sources of hydrogen. Nuclear and solar become the dominant sources of hydrogen
by the end of the century reaching very high levels in the highest scenarios of some 450
and 1100 EJ per year (Figure 8c). Even the medians are high, especially for solar
hydrogen with some 100 EJ per year. Some of the coal-intensive carbon mitigation
scenarios shift from methanol to hydrogen production with carbon capture and storage.
Natural gas is the most robust source of hydrogen across a wide range of scenarios
through 2020 and 2050. By the end of the century solar followed by nuclear hydrogen
become more robust options across a wide range of scenarios.
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Figure 9b. Ranges of synthetic liquids and gases production across scenarios EJ per year for 2050.
Each bar shows the range across IIASA SRES and Post-SRES scenarios for a given technology
from upper to lower bound and for the median. The IIASA-WEC scenarios are highlighted
separately through dashed bars, showing the upper and lower bound as well as the median.
Production of synthetic liquids in 2020 is shared almost equally by coal and natural gas
methanol and biomass ethanol both in the highest scenarios that reach between 15 and 20
EJ per year for the three sources of synliquids and in terms of the medians that are in the
range of some 10 EJ per year. By 2050 coal becomes the dominant source of liquids in
the highest (coal-intensive) scenarios, but the median remains relatively low with about
25 EJ per year. In contrast, the median of biomass ethanol increases rapidly to some 75
EJ per year while the highest scenarios have only marginally higher ethanol production.
The situation does not change drastically by the end of the century except that the
production levels of synthetic liquids increase somewhat.
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Figure 9c. Ranges of synthetic liquids and gases production across scenarios EJ per year for 2100.
Each bar shows the range across IIASA SRES and Post-SRES scenarios for a given technology
from upper to lower bound and for the median. The IIASA-WEC scenarios are highlighted
separately through dashed bars, showing the upper and lower bound as well as the median.
Electricity Generation Across the Scenarios
Figure 10 shows the ranges of electricity generation by deployed technology across
scenarios. Figure 10a shows the ranges for 2020, Figure 10b for 2050 and Figure 10C for
2100. Each “error bar” shows the range across for IIASA, SRES and Post-SRES
scenarios for a given technology from the upper to the lower bound and for the median.
The IIASA-WEC scenarios are highlighted separately through dashed bars, which also
show the upper and lower bound as well as the median. The main reason for substantially
lower ranges for the six IIASA-WEC scenarios is that they have a lower span of energy
use, especially when compared to some of the high demand (e.g. SRES A1 family)
scenarios. In addition, more than half of the 34 scenarios are mitigation and stabilization
cases which ceteris paribus would lead to higher deployment of low and zero-carbon
electricity generation technologies as was the case with production of synthetic fuels. The
relative roles of traditional electricity technologies such as coal power plants decrease
consistently across all scenarios while the role of advanced technologies such as fuel
cells, combined cycles with carbon removal, solar and nuclear power become more
important as time progresses in the scenarios.
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Figure 10a. Ranges of electricity generation across scenarios EJ per year for 2020. Each bar
shows the range across IIASA SRES and Post-SRES scenarios for a given technology from upper
to lower bound and for the median. The IIASA-WEC scenarios are highlighted separately through
dashed bars, showing the upper and lower bound as well as the median.
The medians and the upper bounds indicate that the structure of electricity generation
does not change radically compared with the current situation by 2020 (Figure 10a). The
rigidities of the energy system are too large as much of the current generating capacity
will survive through 2020. The dominant technologies continue to be standard coal (coal
std), advanced coal (IGCC), standard natural gas and natural gas combined cycle (gas std
and GCC) and conventional “low-cost” nuclear systems (nuc lc) and hydropower (hydro).
The highest deployment across advanced technologies takes place for natural gas
combined cycle with carbon scrubbing (only in stabilization scenarios), and “high-cost”
nuclear (nuc hc) and photovoltaics systems (solar pv). Windmills (wind) and hydrogen
fuel cells (h2fc) are also among the technologies that diffuse rapidly, but they have lower
installed capacities compared with the large-scale power systems such as coal or nuclear
power plants.
Changes are much more significant by 2050 (Figure 10b). Half a century is long enough
for the replacement of most of the current energy system by new technologies. This is
well illustrated by a significant shift from conventional (standard) coal (coal std), gas (gas
std) and nuclear (nuc lc) to advanced systems such as combined cycle technology (GCC,
IGCC) and high temperature reactors (nuc htr&fbr)4. The use of conventional (standard)
technologies virtually ceases across the scenarios by the 2050s. Fuel cells, hydrogen
technologies and carbon scrubbing (in stabilization scenarios) also expand dramatically.
4 The major advantage of high temperature reactors compared to conventional heavy or light water reactors is their high
degree of safety, and their high operation temperature, which enables the efficient co-generation of hydrogen via steam
reforming of natural-gas. Note, however, that particularly the hydrogen production via the electrolysis of water (from
Nuc HTR) plays a key role in decarbonizing the energy system in some carbon mitigation scenarios.
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At the same time, the variability in the technologies across scenarios increases as well,
characterized by a comparatively larger difference between the upper bound and the
median (the long “upper tail” of the distribution).
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Figure 10b. Ranges of electricity generation across scenarios EJ per year for 2050. Each bar
shows the range across IIASA, SRES and Post-SRES scenarios for a given technology from
upper to lower bound and for the median. The IIASA-WEC scenarios are highlighted separately
through dashed bars, showing the upper and lower bound as well as the median.
Figure 10b indicates that technological variability becomes greater as scenarios drift
away from each other in terms of the energy systems structure and technological
emphasis. Clearly, scenarios with much higher deployment of given technologies lead to
better performance and comparatively lower cost, indicating increasing “path
dependency” in energy development. This tendency is amplified significantly by 2100
(Figure 10c). Energy systems will be fundamentally different in hundred years compared
to today irrespective of which direction technologies change. Also the “tails” of the
distribution become more elongated. The differences between alternative energy
development trajectories accumulate through technology replacements resulting in a wide
divergence of scenarios form each other.
Figure 11 summarizes the deployment of different electricity generating technologies
across the IIASA and SRES scenarios. It shows that conventional (standard) coal, oil and
gas power plants are phased out of the scenarios after the 2020s. The natural-gas
combined-cycle technology increases in importance and replaces the phased-out
conventional capacity. This development is accompanied by coal gasification in
conjunction with combined cycle. Furthermore, advanced natural-gas combined-cycle
technology with carbon scrubbing and storage is introduced in the scenarios with
emissions mitigation measures (and to a more limited extent in scenarios without
mitigation measures as a source of CO2 for enhanced oil recovery). Last, but not least, the
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fuel cells diffuse widely after the 2020s predominately powered by natural gas and later
also by hydrogen.
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Figure 10c. Ranges of electricity generation across scenarios EJ per year for 2100. Each bar
shows the range across IIASA, SRES and Post-SRES scenarios for a given technology from
upper to lower bound and for the median. The IIASA-WEC scenarios are highlighted separately
through dashed bars, showing the upper and lower bound as well as the median.
Generally, the scale of technology deployment increases over the time horizon
significantly. The range is up to 40 EJ by 2020 (see Figure 10a) increasing to 130 EJ by
2050 (Figure 10b) and to some 400 EJ by 2100, which is comparable to total current
global energy use. This illustrates the significant increase in the scale of electricity
generation across the scenarios. Consequently, sizeable improvements in technology
performance and reduction of costs can be expected as the result of accumulated
experience and increased scale of operations worldwide.
The wide and diverging scale of electricity generating technology deployment across
scenarios is reflected in a changing pattern of investment cost distribution. The greater
the diffusion of a given technology, the lower the investment costs are likely to become
with experience gained through technology learning.
Figure 12 illustrates the patterns of (capital) investment cost changes across all scenarios
for ten selected technologies. The changing costs are shown for the same technologies as
the scale of application in Figure 10. Figure 12a shows the investment costs distribution
for 2020, Figure 12b for 2050 and Figure 12c for 2100.
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2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100
Standard Gas Power Plants (Gas Std)
Natural Gas Combined Cycle (GCC)
Shift to GCC completed
Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle (IGCC)
Standard Oil Power Plants (Oil ppl)
Conventional Coal Power Plants (Coal Std)
Fossil Fuel Cells (predominantly Gas, Gas FC)
high emissions scenarios
low emissions scenarios
GCC including carbon removal & disposal (GCC 0C)
Figure 11. Deployment of fossil electricity generation technologies during the 21st century across
IIASA SRES scenarios. Orange lines indicate the duration of technology deployment across
scenarios. Source: Nakicenovic, et al. 2000b.
Distribution of Investment Costs by 2020
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Figure 12a. Distribution of investment costs for electricity generation across scenarios in 2020.
The colored bars show the distribution of costs for selected technology groups for 34 scenarios
including IIASA SRES, Post-SRES, and IIASA-WEC scenarios. Some have multiple peaks
indicating that the given distribution has more than one mode, e.g., see distribution for
photovoltaics, labeled as solar pv. Mode peaks include between five and 34 scenarios.
* Note that the biomass category shows average costs for the Bio STC and Bio Std technologies, the costs for Coal Std
includes FGD (90 percent) and DENOX (50 percent), the GCC category does not include costs for CO2 removal and
storage, and that the nuclear category shows average costs for the Nuc LC and Nuc HC technologies. Hydropower is
not included in the figure because the costs are assumed to be identical across all scenarios and are distinguished only
for two categories, small and large hydro, that do not change over time. For a description of the technology
abbreviations see Box 1.
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Clearly, the investment costs are only one of the components of technology costs that
include for instance also fuel expenses, operating and maintenance costs, discount rates
and so on. The so-called annualized or levelized costs give an annual aggregate figure for
all of these cost components but have the decided disadvantage that the obtained values
depend a lot on the choice of future discount rates and fuel taxation levels. Only the
investment costs component is compared here in order to avoid the potential pitfalls of
comparing annualized costs that are more a function of the above assumptions than actual
differences in technology characteristics. It should also be noted that costs in general and
especially the investment costs alone do not offer sufficient information to assess
alternative technology options and form policy decisions about these options.
The distribution of investment costs of electricity generation technologies in 2020 is not
all that different from the current situation. This is again due to the fact that much of the
current generating capacity is still likely to be in operation two decades because of the
long-life times of the equipment and other rigidities of the energy system. Many of the
scenarios (20) rank natural gas combined cycle to have the lowest investment costs. The
second cheapest option across all scenarios (34) is conventional gas, which means that
natural gas ranks the lowest in terms of investment costs of all electricity technologies by
2020. The same share of scenarios (about 20) gives wind power generation as ranked next
in rising cost terms, followed by biomass, standard coal and IGCC technologies. Solar
photovoltaics and conventional nuclear (nuc lc & nuc hc) are the most expensive in 2020.
All the technologies except solar photovoltaics have single modes by 2020. The
distribution of photovoltaics costs portrays three modes indicating the complexity (and
uncertainty) of some of these distributions
This pattern of cost distributions illustrates generally why natural-gas combined-cycle is
the technology of choice across most of the scenarios in literature. Its contribution to
future electricity generation is mostly limited by resources and market penetration
constraints rather than through competitive pressure from other technologies.
The cost distributions change somewhat by 2050 (Figure 12b). The main difference is a
“compression” of distributions in the lower costs ranges. The most impressive reduction
in investment costs occurs for the photovoltaics. From clearly the most expensive
technology in 2020, their distribution spreads from very low costs (in the range of
natural-gas combined cycles) to the level of nuclear power plants. Conventional natural
gas (gas std) and conventional coal (coal std) maintain both the high distribution peaks
and their relative positions. The distributions of other technologies bunch more, with
relatively little effect on their relative positions, with natural-gas combined cycle
maintaining the position of lowest costs.
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Distribution of Investment Costs by 2050
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Figure 12b. Distribution of investment costs for electricity generation across scenarios in 2050.
The colored bars show the distribution of costs for selected technology groups for 34 scenarios
including IIASA SRES, Post-SRES, and IIASA-WEC scenarios. Some have multiple peaks
indicating that the given distribution has more than one mode, e.g., see distribution for
photovoltaics, labeled as solar pv. Mode peaks include between five and 34 scenarios.
* Note that the biomass category shows average costs for the Bio STC and Bio Std technologies, the costs for Coal Std
includes FGD (90 percent) and DENOX (50 percent), the GCC category does not include costs for CO2 removal and
storage, and that the nuclear category shows average costs for the Nuc LC and Nuc HC technologies. Hydropower is
not included in the figure because the costs are assumed to be identical across all scenarios and are distinguished only
for two categories, small and large hydro, that do not change over time. For a description of the technology
abbreviations see Box 1.
The compression of the costs distribution continues through 2100 as shown in Figure 12c.
Again, conventional natural gas and coal (gas std and coal std) maintain their relative
positions with high peaks. The distribution of photovoltaics continues to spread and now
virtually covers the whole interval between the lowest and the highest costs. There are a
few scenarios that rank photovoltaics in each cost category. With the exception of coal
fuel cells, all other technologies also develop multiple modes. This all shows that the
investment costs (with the notable exception of conventional natural gas and coal) vary
quite a lot across scenarios as time progresses. Scenarios generally diverge from each
other also in this respect. The notion of path dependency is thus also reflected in the
investment costs distributions. Increasing scale of application of a technology leads to
costs reductions and improvement of performance. The scenarios illustrate in this way the
effect of learning by doing. Also the opposite is true. Technologies remain costly if they
are not applied.
39
Distribution of Investment Costs by 2100
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Figure 12c. Distribution of investment costs for electricity generation across scenarios in 2100.
The colored bars show the distribution of costs for selected technology groups for 34 scenarios
including IIASA SRES, Post-SRES, and IIASA-WEC scenarios. Some have multiple peaks
indicating that the given distribution has more than one mode, e.g., see distribution for
photovoltaics, labeled as solar pv. Mode peaks include between five and 34 scenarios.
* Note that the biomass category shows average costs for the Bio STC and Bio Std technologies, the costs for Coal Std
includes FGD (90 percent) and DENOX (50 percent), the GCC category does not include costs for CO2 removal and
storage, and that the nuclear category shows average costs for the Nuc LC and Nuc HC technologies. Hydropower is
not included in the figure because the costs are assumed to be identical across all scenarios and are distinguished only
for two categories, small and large hydro, that do not change over time. For a description of the technology
abbreviations see Box 1.
The degree of technological learning across scenarios is illustrated in Table 4 for different
electricity technologies. The first column shows the range of average learning rates for
each technology across all 34 scenarios between 1990 and 2100. The second column
gives the same information for the six IIASA-WEC scenarios. The third column
compares these rates with the range from the literature and the fourth gives the respective
literature source. It should be noted, however, that technology learning has been
calculated ex post for these scenarios. None of them included the possibility of
endogenous technological learning. Instead, the “learning rates” given in the first two
columns illustrate how investment costs decline across scenarios as the respective
installed capacity of the technology expands. In the model itself, the costs declines in
time are exogenous while the scale of capacity expansion is endogenous. Thus, the
derived “learning rate” is a mixture of scenario inputs and outputs. One implication of
thehigher learning rates indicated is that major RD&D efforts, and perhaps major new
concepts, are required if some of the technologies are realistically going to play a major
role in meeting future energy needs.
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Table 7: Learning rates (percent per year) across 28 IIASA SRES and Post-SRES scenarios, six
IIASA-WEC scenarios, and from the literature sources.
Scenario Estimates
(1990-2100)
Literature Range
All Scenarios IIASA-WEC
Scenarios
Learning Rate Literature Source
Coal Std 0% - 0% 0% - 0% 1% - 8.4%; OECD: 7.6% 1,2
IGCC 0% - 7% 0% - 3% USA: 3% 2,3
Coal FC -1% - 8% 0% - 0%
Gas Std 0% - 0% 0% - 0%
GCC 1% - 8% 1% - 8% -11% - 34%; EU: 4% 1,3,4
Gas FC 0% - 13% 0% - 3%
Solar PV 0% - 28% 0% - 13% 18% - 35% 3, 9, 10
Nuclear 0% - 10% 0% - 5% OECD: 5.8% 1
Wind 2% - 12% 2% - 7% 4% - 32%; OECD: 17% 1, 5, 6, 7, 8
Biomass 0% - 13% 3% - 7%
Literature sources: 1: Kouvaritis et al. (2000), 2: Joskow and Rose (1985), 3: IEA (2000), 4:
Claeson (1999), 5: CEC (1997), 6: Loiter and Bohm (1999), 7: Durstewitz (1999), 8: Neij (1999),
9: Harmon (2000), 10: Maycock and Wakefield (1975).
* The table depicts learning rates for the same technology groups as shown in Figures 8a,b,c.
Furthermore, learning and diffusion are not only required for energy supply technologies.
They will be required for end-use technologies and energy saving also. This is a needed
area for further research and reporting.
Fuel Requirements for Transportation Across the Scenarios
Changes in the patterns of electricity end use are an important driver of structural
transformation of the whole electricity sector. Similarly, changing patterns of mobility
and goods transport across the scenarios drive the transformations in the structure of final
energy carriers. Today, most of the energy for transport is provided by oil and liquid final
energy forms derived from oil such as diesel and gasoline. The relative roles of these
traditional motor fuels decreases consistently across all scenarios while the role of
synthetic fuels such as methanol, ethanol and hydrogen become more important as time
progresses in the scenarios.
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Figure 13a. Ranges of fuel requirements for transportation across scenarios EJ per year for 2020.
Each bar shows the range across IIASA SRES and Post-SRES scenarios for a given technology
from upper to lower bound and for the median. The IIASA-WEC scenarios are highlighted
separately through dashed bars, showing the upper and lower bound as well as the median.
Figure 13 shows the ranges of final energy requirements for transportation by fuel across
scenarios in EJ per year while Figure 14 shows the same requirements in terms of shares.
Figure 13a shows the ranges of final energy requirements for 2020, Figure 13b for 2050
and Figure 13c for 2100. Figure 14a shows the ranges of final energy shares for 2020,
Figure 13b for 2050 and Figure 13c for 2100. Each “error bar” shows the range across for
IIASA, SRES and Post-SRES scenarios for a given final energy form from the upper to
the lower bound and for the median. The IIASA-WEC scenarios are highlighted
separately through dashed bars, which also show the upper and lower bound as well as
the median. As mentioned, the main reason for substantially lower ranges for the six
IIASA-WEC scenarios is that they have a lower span of energy use, especially when
compared to some of the high demand (e.g. SRES A1 family) scenarios. In addition,
more than half of the 34 scenarios are mitigation and stabilization cases which ceteris
paribus would lead to higher deployment of low and zero-carbon fuels in transportation
such as electricity and synthetic liquid and gaseous fuels.
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Figure 13b. Ranges of fuel requirements for transportation across scenarios EJ per year for 2050.
Each bar shows the range across IIASA SRES and Post-SRES scenarios for a given technology
from upper to lower bound and for the median. The IIASA-WEC scenarios are highlighted
separately through dashed bars, showing the upper and lower bound as well as the median.
Figures 13a and 14a clearly show that this heavy dependence on oil for transportation
continues across the scenarios through 2020. Between 80 and almost 120 EJ of oil-
derived motor fuels are required in 2020 across the scenarios with medians in the regions
of about 100 EJ per year. This is so because mobility and goods transport continue to
increase across all scenarios even in the most developed regions of the world during the
next decades. Synthetic fuels derived from other primary energy sources such as gas, coal
and biomass play a comparatively small role by 2020 indicating again large inertia
inherent in energy systems. It takes decades to develop new infrastructures for alternative
fuels such as methanol or hydrogen produced from other energy sources. Their
contributions reach some 20 EJ per year by 2020 in the highest of the scenarios. This
translates into market shares of less than 15 percent with medians in the range of about
ten percent compared with a market share of 60 to 90 percent with a median of about 80
percent for oil products (see Figure 14a).
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Figure 13c. Ranges of fuel requirements for transportation across scenarios EJ per year for 2100.
Each bar shows the range across IIASA SRES and Post-SRES scenarios for a given technology
from upper to lower bound and for the median. The IIASA-WEC scenarios are highlighted
separately through dashed bars, showing the upper and lower bound as well as the median.
Figures 13b and c and Figures 14b and c illustrate how this dependence on oil for
transport changes across the scenarios toward a more balanced portfolio of energy
carriers for transportation by 2050. Initially, the heavy dependence on oil shifts toward
methanol in high-growth scenarios with high shares of coal such as SRES A1C. Much of
the coal is converted into methanol for transport reaching up to 200 EJ per year by 2050
well in excess of the highest contribution of oil products of some 180 EJ per year.
However, this is so only in the most extreme scenarios, the median contribution of
methanol is still relatively modest with about 20 EJ per year or less than ten percent
market share (see Figure 14b). In fact, natural gas and biomass in the form of ethanol are
more important in terms of their median contributions by 2050.
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Figure 14a. Ranges of fuel market shares in transportation across scenarios in percent for 2020.
Each bar shows the range across IIASA SRES and Post-SRES scenarios for a given technology
from upper to lower bound and for the median. The IIASA-WEC scenarios are highlighted
separately through dashed bars, showing the upper and lower bound as well as the median.
Transportation fuels derived from natural gas and biomass are also crucial for reducing
carbon emissions from the transportation sector in the mitigation scenarios (Post-SRES).
Biomass median is second highest after crude oil reaching some 75 EJ per year by 2050
indicating that ethanol production from biomass is not only a robust technology in itself
but also an important fuel for transportation both as a replacement of oil and as a carbon
emissions mitigation option. The growing role of hydrogen has to be seen also in this
context. The mitigation versions of coal-intensive future such as the SRES A1C scenario
shift from methanol production to hydrogen with carbon capture and storage. This
explains the low median for hydrogen production and the “long tail” of the distribution
towards the high contribution levels is some mitigation scenarios.
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Figure 14b. Ranges of fuel market shares in transportation across scenarios in percent for 2050.
Each bar shows the range across IIASA SRES and Post-SRES scenarios for a given technology
from upper to lower bound and for the median. The IIASA-WEC scenarios are highlighted
separately through dashed bars, showing the upper and lower bound as well as the median.
The importance of synthetic fuels derived from low or zero-carbon energy sources
increases dramatically toward the end of the century especially in the mitigation
scenarios. Crude oil decreases from being the most important source of transportation
fuels in 2020 to being the fifth down the line by 2100 (see Figures 13a and c and 14a and
c), behind hydrogen, ethanol, methanol and gas both in terms of medians and highest
scenarios. Biomass is the most dominant source of transportation fuels across all
scenarios with a median of 150 EJ in 2100 and a median market share of more than 30
percent. Methanol and hydrogen dominate in the highest scenarios with 440 and 420 EJ
in 2100, respectively. As mentioned, these are coal-intensive futures (SRES A1C) where
coal is converted into methanol or hydrogen with carbon capture. Thus, the heavy
dependence on oil for transportation that still persists through 2020 shifts toward
increasing contributions of methanol and ethanol towards the 2050s and then also
hydrogen by the end of the century. Ethanol for biomass becomes the most robust fuel in
the transport sector but the overall structure of supply is much more balanced and
diversified toward the second half of the century than today.
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Figure 14c. Ranges of fuel market shares in transportation across scenarios in percent for 2100.
Each bar shows the range across IIASA SRES and Post-SRES scenarios for a given technology
from upper to lower bound and for the median. The IIASA-WEC scenarios are highlighted
separately through dashed bars, showing the upper and lower bound as well as the median.
Conclusions
The main objective of this assessment was to consider a range of alternative
developments of future energy technologies rather than to attempt to project any one
particular direction of technological change. This is important because the future is
inherently unpredictable and any one single projection is therefore inappropriate as the
assessment tool. Technological change is a complex process that is associated with many
uncertainties. Consequently, our approach was to capture a wide spectrum of
developments in order to assess the implications and possibilities of the materialization of
different alternatives. Scenarios in the literature offer, in general, a large set of alternative
future developments that could be used to assess the ranges and distributions of costs and
other characteristics of future energy technologies. These should of course not be
confused with actual future developments that are unpredictable. Instead, collectively the
scenarios in the literature outline a range of possible developments that presumably also
includes the relevant future development path.
The adopted method was to assess the ranges of deployment and characteristics of future
energy technologies on the basis of a number of scenarios, developed at IIASA by the
MESSAGE energy systems model, that contain assumptions about many different
technologies, their costs and performance. The reason for choosing one single model for
this analysis was simply that detailed information for this model is available and is
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documented in the literature. Another, completely different reason, for choosing the
MESSAGE model was that it was one of the models used to develop both the IIASA-
WEC and IPCC scenarios. Therefore, it contains a wide range of energy technology
developments based on assessments of large writing teams and expert reviews that were
involved in the two scenario development processes with the same basic modeling
approach. Presumably, the scenarios thus contain a comprehensive set of alternative but
nevertheless comparable technological developments. Here we analyzed technological
developments across 34 different scenarios.
One of the main conclusions of the assessment (which has also been reached elsewhere)
is that technology may be more important in determining the structure of future energy
systems and services than key driving forces such as availability of resources, population
growth or economic development. The choice of technology options is, however, a
product of changing social and economic priorities, behavioral changes, and
environmental considerations. There is growing evidence in energy scenarios that
alternative technological developments that result from many specific assumptions in
energy models can lead to fundamentally different future energy systems structures and
services. For example, scenarios that assume relatively abundant and inexpensive fossil
energy and technology availability also tend in general to have high shares of these
options. On the other hand, scenarios with slow progress of fossil technologies also often
anticipate high fossil energy costs and consequently a modest degree of decarbonization
of future energy systems. However, the pace and scale of technological change in
scenarios are heavily dependent upon learning rates, which are a mixture of scenario
inputs and outputs. They may, nevertheless, suggest areas where RD&D efforts are best
focussed.
The five main findings of the assessment are that:
• different development paths favor certain technologies and thus affect the direction of
the overall technological change in a fundamental way;
• research, development and deployment portfolios with different technologies are the
only hedge against the uncertainties described by the ranges of the scenarios;
• widespread and rapid diffusion of technologies implies improvements in technical
performance, reduction of costs and emissions and that this is a cumulative process;
and
• “robust” generic energy sector technologies (across the wide range of scenarios)
include efficiency improvements, decarbonization, clean energy carriers such as
electricity, synfuels and hydrogen and in the long run also zero-carbon energy sources
such as renewables and nuclear; and finally
• the most “robust” single technologies across all variation in the 34 scenarios include
combined-cycle in the medium term (during the first half of the century) and fuel
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cells, photovoltaics and nuclear energy in the long term (during the second half of the
century)..
These five main findings of the assessment summarize what the 34 scenarios,
encompassing many alternative future development paths tell us now about the likely
future technologies that need to be developed and deployed during the next few decades:
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Contribution of Conventional Nuclear Power to Electricity Generation
Histograms of frequency distribution of the role of conventional nuclear power in
electricity generation across scenarios, number of scenarios (from a total of 34) and
generation in EJ per year. Figure A shows the nuclear contribution in 2020, Figure B in
2050 and Figure C in 2100. Two technologies, Nuc LC and Nuc HC (see Box 1)
constitute the aggregate nuclear contribution. The relative positions of IIASA-WEC
scenarios are indicated in the histograms. After clustering during the first decades within
the region of up to 40 EJ per year, the scenarios bifurcate up to 2050 into two groups,
those with less than 60 EJ per year and those between 80 and 140 EJ per year. The
IIASA-WEC scenarios fall all within the first group, while mitigation scenarios with low
stabilization levels tend on average to promote the role of nuclear energy. The spread of
scenarios is quite wide by the end of the century. It is interesting that some of the
mitigation scenarios fall in the groups with high nuclear contribution while other do not.
A possible reason is that after a century of development of new technologies, some
scenarios with low emissions can shift toward higher roles of decarbonization and
renewables. Thus, nuclear energy is quite a robust technology option in the long run.
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Figure A. Histogram of conventional nuclear power contribution to electricity generation across
scenarios in 2020. Nuclear contribution is an aggregate of two technologies, Nuc LC and Nuc HC
(see Box 1).
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Contribution of Conventional Nuclear Power Production in
2050
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Figure B. Histogram of conventional nuclear power contribution to electricity generation across
scenarios in 2050. Nuclear contribution is an aggregate of two technologies, Nuc LC and Nuc HC
(see Box 1).
Contribution of Conventional Nuclear Power Production in
2100
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Figure C. Histogram of conventional nuclear power contribution to electricity generation across
scenarios in 2100. Nuclear contribution is an aggregate of two technologies, Nuc LC and Nuc HC
(see Box 1).
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Contribution of Hydrocarbon Fuel Cells to Electricity Generation
Histograms of frequency distribution of the role of hydrocarbon fuel cells in electricity
generation across scenarios, number of scenarios (from a total of 34) and generation in EJ
per year. Figure A shows the fuel cells contribution in 2020, Figure B in 2050 and Figure
C in 2100. Two technologies, Gas FC and Coal FC technologies (see Box 1), constitute
the aggregate fuel cells contribution. The relative positions of IIASA-WEC scenarios are
indicated in the histograms. After clustering during the first decades within the region of
up to 20 EJ per year, some scenarios lead to very substantial contribution of fuels cells by
2050 of up to 120 EJ per year. The distribution is very skewed in 2050. Virtually all
scenarios that fall above the mean are mitigation cases. All other scenarios fall within the
interval up to 40 EJ per year. The spread of scenarios is quite wide by the end of the
century. Mitigation cases are mixed with other scenarios without any obvious pattern as
was the case 50 years earlier. Thus, fuel cells are a robust technology option in the long
run.
Contribution of Hydrocarbon Fuel Cells to the Power
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Figure A. Histogram of the hydrocarbon fuel cells contribution to electricity generation across
scenarios in 2020. Fuel cells contribution is an aggregate of two technologies, Gas FC and Coal
FC (see Box 1).
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Contribution of Hydrocarbon Fuel Cells to the Power
Production in 2050
0
5
10
15
20
25
<20 20-40 40-60 60-80 80-100 100-120 120-140 140-160 160-180 >180
Power Generation, EJ
N
u
m
be
r
o
fS
c
e
n
a
rio
s
450 ppmv stabilization
550 ppmv stabilization
650 ppmv stabilization
750 ppmv stabilization
Baseline scenarios
median = 4 EJ
IIASA-WEC A1, A2, A3, B, C1, C2
Figure B. Histogram of the hydrocarbon fuel cells contribution to electricity generation across
scenarios in 2050. Fuel cells contribution is an aggregate of two technologies, Gas FC and Coal
FC (see Box 1).
Contribution of Hyrocarbon Fuel Cells to the Power
Production in 2100
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Figure C. Histogram of the hydrocarbon fuel cells contribution to electricity generation across
scenarios in 2100. Fuel cells contribution is an aggregate of two technologies, Gas FC and Coal
FC (see Box 1).
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Contribution of Hydrogen Fuel Cells to Electricity Generation
Histograms of frequency distribution of the role of hydrogen fuel cells (H2FC, Box 1) in
electricity generation across scenarios, number of scenarios (from a total of 34) and
generation in EJ per year. Figure A shows the fuel cells contribution in 2020, Figure B in
2050 and Figure C in 2100. The relative positions of IIASA-WEC scenarios are indicated
in the histograms. After clustering during the first decades within the region of up to 20
EJ per year in much the same way as hydrocarbon fuel cells (see above), some scenarios
lead to a substantial contribution of fuels cells by 2050 of up to 80 EJ per year. The
distribution is very skewed in 2050. A few scenarios that fall between 20 and 40 EJ per
year are mitigation cases. Mitigation and baseline scenarios are otherwise well mixed
with respect to the contribution of hydrogen fuel cells below and above these levels. The
spread of scenarios is quite wide by the end of the century. Again, mitigation and baseline
scenarios jointly presented in most of the categories. . Thus, the hydrogen fuel cells
penetration in the long run is quite independent on the need to control carbon emissions.
The hydrogen fuel cells are apparently favored and a robust technology choice across the
scenarios despite the thigher complexity of the respective energy chains.
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Figure A. Histogram of the hydrogen fuel cells (H2FC) contribution to electricity generation
across scenarios in 2020.
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Contribution of Hydrogen Fuel Cells to the Power
Production in 2050
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Figure B. Histogram of the hydrogen fuel cells (H2FC) contribution to electricity generation
across scenarios in 2050.
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Figure C. Histogram of the hydrogen fuel cells (H2FC) contribution to electricity generation
across scenarios in 2100.
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Contribution of the Conventional Coal Power Plants to Electricity
Generation
Histograms of frequency distribution of the role of conventional coal power plants (Coal
Std) in electricity generation across scenarios, number of scenarios (from a total of 34)
and generation in EJ per year. Figure A shows the contribution in 2020, Figure B in 2050
and Figure C in 2100. The relative positions of IIASA-WEC scenarios are indicated in
the histograms. This is one of the technologies that is not favored in the long run across
all scenarios. The reasons are the relatively high capital costs associated with lower
efficiencies compared to advanced coal technologies and other options. The maximal
contribution of about 40 EJ per year in 2020 is marginally extended by 2050 only to
decline again to this level by 2100. For obvious reasons, the contribution is lower in the
mitigation cases, all of them cluster within the interval up to 20 EJ per year by 2100.
However, advance technologies such as IGCC become the main source of electricity from
coal as is indicated in Figure 1b and c. Advanced coal technologies are favored in the
long run across all scenarios due to the lower costs (improvement with increasing scale of
application) of the whole energy chain and substantially lower emissions of carbon
dioxide and other pollutants.
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Figure A. Histogram of the conventional coal power plants (Coal Std) contribution to electricity
generation across scenarios in 2020 compared to the contribution of IGCC power plants (gray,
dashed lines).
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Contribution of Conventional Coal Power Plants to the
Production in 2050
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Figure B. Histogram of the conventional coal power plants (Coal Std) contribution to electricity
generation across scenarios in 2050 compared to the contribution of IGCC power plants (gray,
dashed lines).
Contribution of Conventional Coal Power Plants to the
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Figure C. Histogram of the conventional coal power plants (Coal Std) contribution to electricity
generation across scenarios in 2100 compared to the contribution of IGCC power plants (gray,
dashed lines).
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Contribution of Solar Photovoltaics Cells to Electricity Generation
Histograms of frequency distribution of the role of solar-photovoltaics electricity
generation across scenarios, number of scenarios (from a total of 34) and generation in EJ
per year. Figure A shows the photovoltaics contribution in 2020, Figure B in 2050 and
Figure C in 2100. The relative positions of IIASA-WEC scenarios are indicated in the
histograms. After clustering during the first decades within the region of up to 20 EJ per
year in much the same way as hydrocarbon fuel cells, some scenarios lead to a substantial
contribution of photovoltaics cells by 2050 of up to 60 EJ per year. The distribution is
quite symmetrical in 2050 especially for scenarios without any mitigation measures. The
spread of scenarios is quite wide by the end of the century and it bifurcates in to two
groups, one under 80 EJ per year and one from 100 to 180 EJ per year. All of the IIASA-
WEC scenarios fall in the first cluster below the mean. All mitigation cases with very low
stabilization levels of 450 ppmv fall in the second cluster. Thus, the photovoltaics
electricity is a very robust technology option across all scenarios in the long run with and
without mitigation measures. However, very stringent mitigation clearly favors very high
contribution of photovoltaics in the very long run.
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Figure A. Histogram of solar photovoltaics contribution to electricity generation across scenarios
in 2020.
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Contribution of Solar PV to the Power Production in 2050
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Figure B. Histogram of solar photovoltaics contribution to electricity generation across scenarios
in 2050.
Contribution of Solar PV to the Power Production in 2100
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Figure C. Histogram of solar photovoltaics contribution to electricity generation across scenarios
in 2100.
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Contribution of Natural-Gas Technologies to Electricity Generation
Histograms of frequency distribution of the role of all natural gas power plants (see Box
1) in electricity generation across scenarios, number of scenarios (from a total of 34) and
generation in EJ per year. Figure A shows the natural gas contribution to electricity in
2020, Figure B in 2050 and Figure C in 2100. The relative positions of IIASA-WEC
scenarios are indicated in the histograms. After clustering during the first decades within
the region of up to 20 EJ per year, electricity from natural gas expands very rapidly
across the scenarios reaching up to 160 EJ per year by 2050 and 180 EJ per year by 2100.
Scenarios are almost equally distributed across the ranges with a pronounced peak
between 20 and 60 EJ per year in 2050. IIASA-WEC scenarios fall generally below the
mean mostly because of their relatively low energy demands compared with the SRES
range. Natural gas proves to be a very robust source of electricity across all scenarios, it
is important across all scenarios, with and without mitigation measures, and during the
whole century.
Contribution of Gas Technologies to the Power
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Figure A. Histogram of gas technologies contribution to electricity generation across scenarios in
2020. The contribution of natural gas is an aggregate of four technologies, Gas Std, GCC, GCC
0C, and Gas FC technologies (see Box 1).
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Contribution of Gas Technologies to the Power
Production in 2050
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Figure B. Histogram of gas technologies contribution to electricity generation across scenarios in
2050. The contribution of natural gas is an aggregate of four technologies, Gas Std, GCC, GCC
0C, and Gas FC technologies (see Box 1).
Contribution of Gas Technologies to the Power
Production in 2100
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Figure C. Histogram of gas technologies contribution to electricity generation across scenarios in
2100. The contribution of natural gas is an aggregate of four technologies, Gas Std, GCC, GCC
0C, and Gas FC technologies (see Box 1).
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Contribution of All Natural-Gas Combined-Cycle Power Plants to
Electricity Generation
Histograms of frequency distribution of the role of all natural gas combined cycle power
plants in electricity generation across scenarios, number of scenarios (from a total of 34)
and generation in EJ per year. Some of the mitigation scenarios include carbon scrubbing
and storage. Figure A shows the gas combined cycle contribution to electricity in 2020,
Figure B in 2050 and Figure C in 2100. The relative positions of IIASA-WEC scenarios
are indicated in the histograms. After clustering during the first decades within the region
of up to 40 EJ per year, electricity from natural gas expands very rapidly across the
scenarios reaching up to 160 EJ per year by 2050 and 180 EJ per year by 2100. Scenarios
are almost equally distributed across the ranges with a very pronounced peak between 20
and 60 EJ per year in 2050. IIASA-WEC scenarios fall generally below the mean mostly
because of their relatively low energy demands compared with the SRES range.
However, two of them portray very high contributions by 2100 in the range from 60 to
100 EJ per year. There is a certain degree of bifurcation among the scenarios by 2100
with more than half of them falling in the lowest and the highest categories. The
scenarios in the highest category are mostly mitigation cases that deploy a lot of carbon
combined cycle with carbon scrubbing and storage rendering natural gas in to a “zero-
carbon” electricity option. Nevertheless, just like all natural gas technologies the
combined-cycle natural gas proves to be a very robust source of electricity across all
scenarios, with and without mitigation measures, and during the whole century.
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Figure A. Histogram of all natural-gas combined cycle contribution to electricity generation
across scenarios in 2020. The contribution of natural gas combined cycle power plants is an
aggregate of two technologies, GCC and GCC 0C. technologies (see Box 1).
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Contribution of Gas Combined Cycle to the Power
Production in 2050
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Figure B. Histogram of all natural-gas combined cycle contribution to electricity generation
across scenarios in 2050. The contribution of natural gas combined cycle power plants is an
aggregate of two technologies, GCC and GCC 0C. technologies (see Box 1).
Contribution of Gas Combined Cycle to the Power
Production in 2100
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Figure C. Histogram of all natural-gas combined cycle contribution to electricity generation
across scenarios in 2100. The contribution of natural gas combined cycle power plants is an
aggregate of two technologies, GCC and GCC 0C. technologies (see Box 1).
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Contribution of Natural-Gas Combined Cycle Power Plants without
Carbon Scrubbing and Storage to Electricity Generation
Histograms of frequency distribution of the role of natural gas combined cycle power
plants (GCC, without carbon scrubbing and storage) in electricity generation across
scenarios, number of scenarios (from a total of 34) and generation in EJ per year. Figure
A shows the natural gas contribution to electricity in 2020, Figure B in 2050 and Figure C
in 2100. The relative positions of IIASA-WEC scenarios are indicated in the histograms.
After clustering during the first decades within the region of up to 20 EJ per year,
electricity from natural gas expands across the scenarios reaching up to 80 EJ per year by
2050 and 180 EJ per year by 2100. Scenarios portray a very strong peak between 20 and
40 EJ per year in 2050 and between 0 and 20 EJ per year by 2100. Nevertheless, just like
all natural gas technologies the combined-cycle natural gas proves to be a very robust
source of electricity across all scenarios, it is important across all scenarios, but less so
without carbon scrubbing and removal.
Contribution of GCC to the Power Production in 2020
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Figure A. Histogram of natural-gas combined cycle power plants (GCC, without carbon
scrubbing and storage) contribution to electricity generation across scenarios in 2020.
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Contribution of GCC to the Power Production in 2050
(without carbon scrubbing and storage)
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Figure B. Histogram of natural-gas combined cycle power plants (GCC, without carbon
scrubbing and storage) contribution to electricity generation across scenarios in 2050.
Contribution of GCC to the Power Production in 2100
(without carbon scrubbing and storage)
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Figure C. Histogram of natural-gas combined cycle power plants (GCC, without carbon
scrubbing and storage) contribution to electricity generation across scenarios in 2100.
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Contribution of Biomass Power Plants to Electricity Generation
Histograms of frequency distribution of the role of biomass power plants in electricity
generation across scenarios, number of scenarios (from a total of 34) and generation in EJ
per year. Figure A shows the biomass contribution in 2020, Figure B in 2050 and Figure
C in 2100. The relative positions of IIASA-WEC scenarios are indicated in the
histograms. After clustering through 2050 within the region of up to 20 EJ per year in
much the same way as for hydrocarbon fuel cells and solar pv, some scenarios lead to a
much more substantial contribution of biomass to electricity generation by 2100 of up to
100 EJ per year. Actually, the distribution is quite asymmetrical in 2100 for all scenarios.
Most of the scenarios are still clustered within the region of up to 20 EJ per year and
include both mitigation and baseline scenarios. A few of the mitigation scenarios,
however, extend to the region between 80 and 100 EJ per year. This results in the
bifurcation by end of the century into two groups, one under 60 EJ per year and one from
80 to 100 EJ per year. All of the IIASA-WEC scenarios fall in the first cluster. Notable is
the fact that the mean contribution of biomass across all scenarios falls over the time from
8 EJ per year in 2020 to 3.3 EJ per year in 2050 increasing slightly to 5 EJ per year by
2100. Thus, the biomass for electricity generation is not employed much across many
scenarios indicating that it is not a very robust technology option in the long run with and
without mitigation measures. However, is does play a very important role in some of the
scenarios also in the very long run.
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Figure A. Histogram of biomass contribution to electricity generation across scenarios in 2020.
Biomass contribution is an aggregate of two technologies, Bio STC and Bio GTC (see Box 1).
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Contribution of Biomass Power Production in 2050
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Figure B. Histogram of biomass contribution to electricity generation across scenarios in 2050.
Biomass contribution is an aggregate of two technologies, Bio STC and Bio GTC (see Box 1).
Contribution of Biomass Power Production in 2100
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Figure C. Histogram of biomass contribution to electricity generation across scenarios in 2100.
Biomass contribution is an aggregate of two technologies, Bio STC and Bio GTC (see Box 1).
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Contribution of Wind Plants to Electricity Generation
Histograms of frequency distribution of the role of wind power plants in electricity
generation across scenarios, number of scenarios (from a total of 34) and generation in EJ
per year. Figure A shows the wind power contribution in 2020, Figure B in 2050 and
Figure C in 2100. The relative positions of IIASA-WEC scenarios are indicated in the
histograms. After clustering through 2020 within the region of up to 20 EJ per year in
much the same way as hydrocarbon fuel cells and solar pv, some scenarios lead to a more
substantial contribution of wind power to electricity generation by 2050 continuing
through 2100 of up to 40 EJ per year. Thus, the distribution is quite narrow over the
whole time horizon. Most of the scenarios cluster within the region of up to 20 EJ per
year and include both mitigation and baseline scenarios. All of the IIASA-WEC scenarios
fall within the same range of up to 20 EJ per year with the exception of A3 scenario. The
mean contribution of wind power across all scenarios increases over the time from 3 EJ
per year in 2020 to 18 EJ per year by 2100. This is a substantial mean increase over time
considering the fact that wind is an intermittent source of electricity so that high shares of
electricity generation need to be enhanced by dedicated storage. Such storage facilities
are not required as the share of wind stays below the critical thresholds in the scenarios.
Basically, the sheer size of the grid offers the necessary buffering capacity that offsets the
intermittent nature of wind power. Thus, wind power plays a very important role across
the scenarios also in the very long run. It can be characterized to be a robust technology
option even without the deployment of costly dedicated storage facilities.
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Figure A. Histogram of wind contribution to electricity generation across scenarios in 2020.
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Contribution of Wind Power Production in 2050
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Figure B. Histogram of wind contribution to electricity generation across scenarios in 2050.
Contribution of Wind Power Production in 2100
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Figure C. Histogram of wind contribution to electricity generation across scenarios in 2100.
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Contribution of Coal Gasification to Hydrogen Production
Histograms of frequency distribution of hydrogen production through coal gasification
across scenarios, number of scenarios (from a total of 34) and production in EJ per year.
Figure A shows the hydrogen production in 2020, Figure B in 2050 and Figure C in 2100.
The relative positions of IIASA-WEC scenarios are indicated in the histograms. After
clustering through 2020 within the region of up to 20 EJ per year, some mitigation
scenarios lead to a much more substantial hydrogen production of up to 60 EJ per year by
2050. However, most of the scenarios are still below 20 EJ per year including all baseline
scenarios (without mitigation measures). This implies that production of hydrogen from
coal becomes economical only if decarbonization is a high priority as is the case in
mitigation scenarios. In fact, the high levels of hydrogen production of between 40 to 60
EJ per year occur only in the case of most stringent mitigation measures required to
achieve atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations stabilization at 450 ppm. The
distribution does not change much by 2100. The only exception is that some of the 450
ppm stabilization scenarios shift into the higher category of 60 to 80 EJ per year. The
distribution is quite asymmetrical for all three time periods and all scenarios because
most of the scenarios are clustered within the region of up to 20 EJ per year and include
some mitigation and all baseline scenarios. All of the IIASA-WEC scenarios fall in the
first cluster with less than 20 EJ per year. Notable is the fact that the median is very low
with 1 EJ per year and that it does not change much throughout the century. Thus, the
hydrogen from coal is not a very robust technology option in the long run and is deployed
only in the most stringent mitigation measures.
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Figure A. Histogram of hydrogen production from coal gasification across scenarios in 2020.
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Contribution of coal gasification to hydrogen production
in 2050
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Figure B. Histogram of hydrogen production from coal gasification across scenarios in 2050.
Contribution of coal gasification to hydrogen production
in 2100
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Figure C. Histogram of hydrogen production from coal gasification across scenarios in 2100.
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Contribution of Coal to Liquids Production
Histograms of frequency distribution of coal liquefaction and light-oil synthesis across
scenarios, number of scenarios (from a total of 34) and production in EJ per year. Figure
A shows the liquids production in 2020, Figure B in 2050 and Figure C in 2100. The
relative positions of IIASA-WEC scenarios are indicated in the histograms. After
clustering through 2020 within the region of up to 20 EJ per year, some baseline
scenarios lead to a more substantial liquids production of up to 40 EJ per year by 2050.
However, most of the scenarios are still below 20 EJ per year including all mitigation
scenarios This is different from the situation of hydrogen production from coal where
higher levels occurred only in the mitigation scenarios. Apparently coal liquefaction is
not attractive in mitigation cases because of the carbon-intensity of the produced liquids.
This trend is strengthened toward the end of the century although the distribution does
not change fundamentally. In fact, it is identical to the case of hydrogen production by
2100. Most of the scenarios cluster within the first interval of up to 20 EJ per year, a few
extend to 40 EJ per year, the interval between 40 and 60 EJ per year is empty and there
are again a few scenarios in the interval of up to 80 EJ per year. All mitigation scenarios
remain in the lowest category. Thus, coal liquefaction is not a robust strategy especially
should mitigation of carbon emissions become widespread. The distribution is quite
asymmetrical for all three time periods and all scenarios. All of the IIASA-WEC
scenarios fall in the first cluster with less than 20 EJ per year. Notable is the fact that the
median is very low with less than 1 EJ per year and that it does not change much
throughout the century. Thus, the transformation of coal to liquids is not a very robust
technology option in the long run and is deployed only in the scenarios without
mitigation measures.
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Figure A. Histogram of liquids production from coal across scenarios in 2020.
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Contribution of Coal to Liquids Production in 2050
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Figure B. Histogram of liquids production from coal across scenarios in 2050.
Contribution of Coal to Liquids Production in 2100
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Figure C. Histogram of liquids production from coal across scenarios in 2100.
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Contribution of Coal to Methanol Production
Histograms of frequency distribution of methanol production from coal across scenarios,
number of scenarios (from a total of 34) and production in EJ per year. Figure A shows
the methanol production in 2020, Figure B in 2050 and Figure C in 2100. The relative
positions of IIASA-WEC scenarios are indicated in the histograms. After clustering
through 2020 mostly within the range of up to 20 EJ per year with only a few scenarios
extending up to 40 EJ per year, some baseline scenarios lead to a much more substantial
methanol production by 2050. Majority of scenarios falls within the region of up to 60 EJ
per year but many extend well beyond into the region of between 140 and more than 180
EJ per year. The space in-between is vacant. Thus, the distribution is very asymmetrical
in 2050 portraying strong bifurcation into two distinct clusters of scenarios. Most of the
scenarios that fall in the higher cluster are mitigation cases. The spread of scenarios is
quite wide by the end of the century. Mitigation cases are mixed with other scenarios
without any obvious pattern. Thus, methanol production from coal is a robust technology
option in the long run. Most of the methanol is used in the transportation sector and for
hydrocarbon fuel cells in the electricity sector thus leading to very high conversion
efficiencies and comparatively low emissions. It is therefore not accidental that the
distributions of hydrocarbon fuel cells and methanol production from coal are very
similar in all three time periods. Two of the six IIASA-WEC scenarios also portray high
levels of methanol production by 2100 falling into the ranges of 60 to 80 EJ and 100 to
120 EJ per year, respectively. Notable is the fact that the medians are quite low especially
in 2050 and 2100 with values of 25 and 13 EJ per year, respectively, given how
widespread are the distributions of the scenarios.
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Figure A. Histogram of methanol production from coal across scenarios in 2020.
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Contribution of Coal to Methanol Production in 2050
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Figure B. Histogram of methanol production from coal across scenarios in 2050.
Contribution of Coal to Methanol Production in 2100
0
5
10
15
20
25
<20 20-40 40-60 60-80 80-100 100-120 120-140 140-160 160-180 >180
Power Generation, EJ
N
u
m
be
r
o
fS
c
e
n
a
rio
s
450 ppmv stabilization
550 ppmv stabilization
650 ppmv stabilization
750 ppmv stabilization
Baseline scenarios
median = 13 EJ
IIASA-WEC A1, A3, C1,C2
IIASA-WEC B IIASA-WEC A2
Figure C. Histogram of methanol production from coal across scenarios in 2100.
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Contribution of Biomass to Ethanol Production
Histograms of frequency distribution of methanol production from coal across scenarios,
number of scenarios (from a total of 34) and production in EJ per year. Figure A shows
the methanol production in 2020, Figure B in 2050 and Figure C in 2100. The relative
positions of IIASA-WEC scenarios are indicated in the histograms. After clustering
through 2020 within the region of up to 20 EJ per year, the scenarios cover a wide range
of up to 100 EJ per year by 2050. All mitigation scenarios fall within a high interval of 60
to 100 EJ per year. This indicates the importance of biomass as a mitigation option.
However, the baseline scenarios also extend into this interval indicating that over the next
decades biomass is also a very robust energy source across a wide range of scenarios. The
IIASA-WEC scenarios are distributed over the interval up to 60 EJ per year. The IPCC
baseline scenarios are quite evenly distributed over the whole range up to 100 EJ per
year. The median is quite high with 25 EJ per year because mitigation cases all cluster
toward the high end of the range. Consequently, the distribution is very skewed by 2050.
All scenarios are distributed more evenly by the end of the century covering all intervals
except the contributions between 20 and 40 EJ per year and slightly higher clustering
within the last interval of more than 180 EJ per year. This results in a very high median
contribution of 151 EJ per year. Thus, ethanol production from biomass is a very robust
energy technology across a very wide range of scenarios.
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Figure A. Histogram of ethanol production from biomass across scenarios in 2020.
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Contribution of Biomass to Ethanol Production in 2050
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Figure B. Histogram of ethanol production from biomass across scenarios in 2050.
Contribution of Biomass to Ethanol Production in 2100
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Figure C. Histogram of ethanol production from biomass across scenarios in 2100.
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Contribution of Natural Gas to Methanol Production
Histograms of frequency distribution of methanol production from natural gas across
scenarios, number of scenarios (from a total of 34) and production in EJ per year. Figure
A shows the methanol production in 2020, Figure B in 2050 and Figure C in 2100. The
relative positions of IIASA-WEC scenarios are indicated in the histograms. After
clustering through 2020 within the region of up to 20 EJ per year in much the same way
as methanol production from coal, some scenarios lead to a more substantial contribution
of natural gas to methanol production by 2050 of up to 40 EJ per year extending up to 60
EJ per year by 2100. Thus, the distribution is quite narrow over the whole time horizon.
All scenarios cluster within this narrow range and include both mitigation and baseline
scenarios. All of the IIASA-WEC scenarios fall within the range of up to 20 EJ per year
with the exception of A1 scenario. The median contribution across all scenarios increases
over the time from 7 EJ per year in 2020 to 11 EJ per year by 2100. Thus, natural gas
plays quite an important role across the scenarios also as the source of methanol in
addition to its important role in electricity generation.
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Figure A. Histogram of methanol production from natural gas across scenarios in 2020.
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Contribution of Natural Gas to Methanol Production in
2050
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Figure B. Histogram of methanol production from coal across scenarios in 2050.
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Figure C. Histogram of methanol production from coal across scenarios in 2100.
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Contribution of Coal to Syngas Production
Histograms of frequency distribution of syngas production from coal gasification across
scenarios, number of scenarios (from a total of 34) and production in EJ per year. Figure
A shows the syngas production in 2020, Figure B in 2050 and Figure C in 2100. The
relative positions of IIASA-WEC scenarios are indicated in the histograms. After
clustering within the narrow range of up to 20 EJ per year through 2050, some scenarios
lead to very substantial contribution of syngas production from coal by 2100 of up to 120
EJ per year. The distribution is very skewed in 2100 and portrays an unoccupied gap
between 80 and 100 EJ per year. All of the IIASA-WEC scenarios fall within the narrow
range of up to 20 EJ per year over the whole time period with the exception of the A2
scenario. Altogether, coal plays a modest role in syngas production across the scenarios
with a similar distribution as coal liquefaction. Notable is the fact that the median is very
low with much less than 1 EJ per year and that it does not change much throughout the
century. Thus, the gasification of coal for syngas production is not a very robust
technology option in the long run.
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Figure A. Histogram of syngas production from coal across scenarios in 2020.
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Contribution of Coal to Syngas Production in 2050
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Figure B. Histogram of syngas production from coal across scenarios in 2050.
Contribution of Coal to Syngas Production in 2100
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Figure C. Histogram of syngas production from coal across scenarios in 2100.
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Contribution of Biomass to Syngas Production
Histograms of frequency distribution of syngas production from biomass gasification
across scenarios, number of scenarios (from a total of 34) and production in EJ per year.
Figure A shows the syngas production in 2020, Figure B in 2050 and Figure C in 2100.
The relative positions of IIASA-WEC scenarios are indicated in the histograms. After
clustering within the narrow range of up to 20 EJ per year through 2020, a few mitigation
scenarios lead to a more substantial contribution of syngas production from biomass by
2050 of up to 60 EJ per year. The clustering of the scenarios continues throughout the
century, but a few more of the mitigation scenarios spread forming a very long
distribution tail extending all the way to 180 EJ per year. However, the tail is very thin
and is interrupted by three unoccupied intervals. Thus, the distribution is very skewed
both in 2050 and 2100. All of the IIASA-WEC and IPCC baseline scenarios fall within
the narrow range of up to 20 EJ per year as well as majority of the mitigation cases. This
means that syngas production from biomass becomes more widespread if decarbonization
becomes a more important priority. Altogether, biomass plays a modest role in syngas
production across the scenarios with a similar distribution as syngas production from coal
and coal liquefaction. Notable is the fact that the median is very low with much less than
1 EJ per year and that it does not change much throughout the century increasing
modestly to 1.6 EJ per year by 2100. Thus, the gasification of bomass for syngas
production is not a very robust technology option in the long run.
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Figure A. Histogram of syngas production from biomass across scenarios in 2020.
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Contribution of Biomass to Syngas Production in 2050
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Figure B. Histogram of syngas production from biomass across scenarios in 2050.
Contribution of Biomass to Syngas Production in 2100
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Figure C. Histogram of syngas production from biomass across scenarios in 2100.
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Contribution of Natural Gas Steam Reforming to Hydrogen Production
Histograms of frequency distribution of hydrogen production from steam-reforming of
natural gas across scenarios, number of scenarios (from a total of 34) and production in
EJ per year. Figure A shows the hydrogen production in 2020, Figure B in 2050 and
Figure C in 2100. The relative positions of IIASA-WEC scenarios are indicated in the
histograms. After clustering through 2020 within the range of up to 20 EJ per year, the
distribution extends considerably by 2050. Majority of scenarios still falls within the
range of up to 40 EJ per year but some extend well beyond into the region of 120 EJ per
year. Thus, the distribution is very skewed in 2050, but the median increases
considerably from 7.3 EJ per year in 2020 to 23 EJ per year by 2050 because most of the
scenarios are situated in the region of up to 40 EJ per year. Most of the scenarios re-
cluster in the narrow range up to 20 EJ per year by 2100. However, the distribution also
becomes even more skewed with a very thin tail extending beyond 180 EJ per year by
2100. This tail of the distribution is interrupted by three unoccupied intervals. Six from
the ten scenarios that extend beyond 20 EJ per year occupy the interval of 100 to 120 EJ
per year. Consequently, the median also falls back to 7.7 EJ per year. Thus, hydrogen
production from natural gas is more important through 2050 than beyond that period.
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Figure A. Histogram of hydrogen production from natural gas across scenarios in 2020.
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Contribution of Natural Gas Steam Reforming to Hydrogen
Production in 2050
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Figure B. Histogram of hydrogen l production from natural gas l across scenarios in 2050.
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Figure C. Histogram of hydrogen production from natural gas across scenarios in 2100.
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Contribution of Biomass to Hydrogen Production
Histograms of frequency distribution of hydrogen production from biomass gasification
across scenarios, number of scenarios (from a total of 34) and production in EJ per year.
Figure A shows the hydrogen production in 2020, Figure B in 2050 and Figure C in 2100.
The relative positions of IIASA-WEC scenarios are indicated in the histograms. After
clustering within the narrow range of up to 20 EJ per year through 2020, two IPCC
baseline scenarios lead to a more substantial contribution of hydrogen production from
biomass by 2050 of up to 40 EJ per year. The clustering of the scenarios continues
throughout the century, but a few more of the mitigation scenarios spread forming a very
long distribution tail extending all the way to 160 EJ per year. However, the tail is very
thin consisting of only three scenarios so that it is interrupted by two unoccupied
intervals. Thus, the distribution is very skewed both in 2050 and 2100. All of the
mitigation scenarios and IIASA-WEC fall within the narrow range of up to 20 EJ per year
with the exception of A2. This means that hydrogen production from biomass plays a
modest role in hydrogen production across the scenarios with a similar distribution as
syngas production from coal and biomass. Notable is the fact that the median is very low
and decreases from 1.3 EJ per year in 2020 to 0.1 EJ per year by 2100 Thus, the
gasification of biomass for hydrogen production is not a very robust technology option in
the long run.
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Figure A. Histogram of hydrogen production from biomass across scenarios in 2020.
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Contribution of Biomass to Hydrogen Production in 2050
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Figure B. Histogram of hydrogen production from biomass across scenarios in 2050.
Contribution of Biomass to Hydrogen Production in 2100
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Figure C. Histogram of hydrogen production from biomass across scenarios in 2100.
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Contribution of Electricity to Hydrogen Production
Histograms of frequency distribution of hydrogen production through electrolysis across
scenarios, number of scenarios (from a total of 34) and production in EJ per year. Figure
A shows the hydrogen production in 2020, Figure B in 2050 and Figure C in 2100. The
relative positions of IIASA-WEC scenarios are indicated in the histograms. All scenarios
cluster within the narrow range of up to 20 EJ per year throughout the century with the
exception of two mitigation scenarios with the low ceiling of atmospheric carbon dioxide
concentrations of 450 ppmv that are in the range of 40 to 60 EJ per year by 2100. In fact,
electrolysis does not play any significant role in the majority of scenarios. This is
illustrated by the median of zero throughout the whole century, which indicates that in
more than fifty percent of the scenarios electrolysis does not enter the market at all.
Therefore, electrolysis does not constitute an important option for hydrogen production.
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Figure A. Histogram of hydrogen production from electricity across scenarios in 2020.
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Contribution of Electricity to Hydrogen Production in 2050
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Figure B. Histogram of hydrogen production from electricity across scenarios in 2050.
Contribution of Electricity to Hydrogen Production in 2100
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Figure C. Histogram of hydrogen production from electricity across scenarios in 2100.
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Contribution of Nuclear Energy to Hydrogen Production
Histograms of frequency distribution of hydrogen production from high-temperature
nuclear reactors across scenarios, number of scenarios (from a total of 34) and production
in EJ per year. Figure A shows the hydrogen production in 2020, Figure B in 2050 and
Figure C in 2100. The relative positions of IIASA-WEC scenarios are indicated in the
histograms. After clustering within the narrow range of up to 20 EJ per year through
2020, four scenarios lead to a more substantial contribution of syngas production from
biomass by 2050 of up to 60 EJ per year. The clustering of the scenarios continues
throughout the century, but a few more scenarios spread forming a very long distribution
tail extending all the way beyond 180 EJ per year. However, the tail is very thin and is
interrupted by three unoccupied intervals. Thus, the distribution is very skewed both in
2050 and 2100. All of the IIASA-WEC with the exception of A1 in 2100 fall within the
narrow range of up to 20 EJ per year. This means that hydrogen production from nuclear
energy becomes slightly more widespread but continues to play a modest role in
hydrogen production across the scenarios with a similar distribution as syngas production
from coal and bomass liquefaction. Notable is the fact that the median is zero EJ per year,
which indicates that in more than fifty percent of the scenarios electrolysis does not enter
the market at all. Thus, the production of hydrogen through high-temperature nuclear
reactors is not a very robust technology option in the long run.
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Figure A. Histogram of hydrogen production from nuclear energy across scenarios in 2020.
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Contribution of Nuclear Energy to Hydrogen Production in
2050
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Figure B. Histogram of hydrogen production from nuclear energy across scenarios in 2050.
Contribution of Nuclear Energy to Hydrogen Production in
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Figure C. Histogram of hydrogen production from nuclear energy across scenarios in 2100.
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Contribution of Solar Thermal to Hydrogen Production
Histograms of frequency distribution of hydrogen production from solar thermal power
plants across scenarios, number of scenarios (from a total of 34) and production in EJ per
year. Figure A shows the hydrogen production in 2020, Figure B in 2050 and Figure C in
2100. The relative positions of IIASA-WEC scenarios are indicated in the histograms.
After clustering through 2020 within the range of up to 20 EJ per year, the distribution
extends considerably by 2050. Majority of scenarios still falls within the range of up to
20 EJ per year including all IIASA-WEC scenarios, but some scenarios extend well
beyond into the region of 160 EJ per year. This long tail of the distribution is interrupted
by two unoccupied intervals. Thus, the distribution is very skewed in 2050, and most of
the scenarios are situated in the region of up to 20 EJ per year. This clustering in the
narrow range up to 20 EJ per year is still pronounced by 2100. However, the distribution
bifurcates with equal number of scenarios forming a second pronounced cluster within
the interval of 180 EJ and beyond. These two modes of the distribution are connected by
a very thin tail extending with a gap in the range of 140 to 180 EJ per year in 2100.
Consequently, the median increases considerably from zero in 2050 to 95 EJ per year by
2100. Thus, hydrogen production from solar thermal becomes an important source of
hydrogen by 2050 and even more so beyond that period.
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Figure A. Histogram of hydrogen production from solar thermal across scenarios in 2020.
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Contribution of Solar Thermal to Hydrogen Production in
2050
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Figure B. Histogram of hydrogen production from solar thermal across scenarios in 2050.
Contribution of Solar Thermal to Hydrogen Production in
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Figure C. Histogram of hydrogen production from solar thermal across scenarios in 2100.
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Investment Costs for Conventional Nuclear Power Plants
Histograms of frequency distribution of the investment costs of conventional nuclear
power plants across scenarios, number of scenarios (from a total of 34) and 1990 dollars
per kW installed electric capacity. Figure A shows the average investment costs for two
nuclear technologies, Nuc LC and Nuc HC (see Box 1) in 2020, Figure B in 2050 and
Figure C in 2100. The relative positions of IIASA-WEC scenarios are indicated in the
histograms. After clustering during the first decades within the region of more than $1800
per kW installed electric capacity, some of the investments in 2050 in new capacity
become lower extending down to $1600 per kW installed and start bifurcating into two
categories with costs between $1400 to 1600 and $1800 and more per kW installed by
2100. The main exception is the IIASA-WEC A3 scenario that has substantial nuclear
shares by 2100 and investment costs in between the two distribution peaks. All of the
other nuclear investment costs for the IIASA-WEC scenarios fall in the upper category
partially because the scale of application is not as high as in IPCC scenarios and partially
because more advanced and thus costlier facilities are assumed for the latter periods.
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Figure A. Histogram of investment costs for conventional nuclear power plants across scenarios
in 2020. Average costs for two nuclear technologies, Nuc LC and Nuc HC (see Box 1)
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Investment Costs for Conventional Nuclear Power Plants
in 2050
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Figure B. Histogram of investment costs for conventional nuclear power plants across scenarios
in 2050. Average costs for two nuclear technologies, Nuc LC and Nuc HC (see Box 1)
Investment Costs for Conventional Nuclear Power Plants
in 2100
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Figure C. Histogram of investment costs for conventional nuclear power plants across scenarios
in 2100. Average costs for two nuclear technologies, Nuc LC and Nuc HC (see Box 1)
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Investment Costs for Coal Fuel Cells
Histograms of frequency distribution of the investment costs of coal fuel cells across
scenarios, number of scenarios (from a total of 34) and 1990 dollars per kW installed
electric capacity. Figure A shows the investment costs in 2020, Figure B in 2050 and
Figure C in 2100. The relative positions of IIASA-WEC scenarios are indicated in the
histograms. After clustering during the first decades within the region of more than $1800
per kW installed electric capacity, the investment costs bifurcate into two categories, one
with costs between $1400 to 1600 and the other with $1800 and more per kW installed
during the period from 2050 to 2100. Most of the mitigation scenarios fall within the
lower cost category interval primarily because the scale of application of these
technologies is higher in these scenarios leading to higher assumed rates of costs
reductions.
Investment Costs for Coal Fuel Cells in 2020
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Figure A. Histogram of investment costs for coal fuel cells (Coal FC) across scenarios in 2020.
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Investment Costs for Coal Fuel Cells in 2050
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Figure B. Histogram of investment costs for coal fuel cells (Coal FC) across scenarios in 2050.
Investment Costs for Coal Fuel Cells in 2100
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Figure C. Histogram of investment costs for coal fuel cells (Coal FC) across scenarios in 2100.
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Investment Costs for Natural-Gas Fuel Cells
Histograms of frequency distribution of the investment costs of natural gas fuel cells
across scenarios, number of scenarios (from a total of 34) and 1990 dollars per kW
installed electric capacity. Figure A shows the investment costs in 2020, Figure B in 2050
and Figure C in 2100. The relative positions of IIASA-WEC scenarios are indicated in
the histograms. After clustering during the first decades within the region of between
$1000 and 1200 per kW installed electric capacity, some of the investments in 2050 in
new capacity become lower extending down to $800 per kW installed and start
bifurcating into two categories with costs between $600 to 800 and between $1000 and
1200 per kW installed by 2100. Most of the mitigation scenarios fall within the lower
cost category interval primarily because the scale of application of these technologies is
higher in these scenarios leading to higher assumed rates of costs reductions. The IIASA-
WEC scenarios fall in the upper category primarily because the scale of application is not
as high as in IPCC scenarios.
Investment Costs for Natural Gas Fuel Cells in 2020
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Figure A. Histogram of investment costs for natural-gas fuel cells (Gas FC) across scenarios in
2020.
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Investment Costs for Natural Gas Fuel Cells in 2050
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Figure B. Histogram of investment costs for natural-gas fuel cells (Gas FC) across scenarios in
2050.
Investment Costs for Natural Gas Fuel Cells in 2100
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Figure C. Histogram of investment costs for natural-gas fuel cells (Gas FC) across scenarios in
2100.
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Investment Costs for Conventional Coal Power Plants
Histograms of frequency distribution of the investment costs of conventional (steam
cycle) coal power plants across scenarios, number of scenarios (from a total of 34) and
1990 dollars per kW installed electric capacity. Figure A shows the investment costs in
2020, Figure B in 2050 and Figure C in 2100. The relative positions of IIASA-WEC
scenarios are indicated in the histograms. Investment costs cluster during the whole time
horizon within the region of between $1200 and 1400 per kW installed electric capacity.
After 2020 the conventional steam-cycle power plants are gradually phased out in all
scenarios because advanced, more efficient and cleaner, technologies become more
competitive. Therefore, the installed capacities decline across the scenarios, more rapidly
in the mitigation scenarios, leading to little improvement in investment costs.
Investment Costs for Conventional Coal Power Plants
in 2020
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Figure A. Histogram of investment costs for conventional coal power plants (Coal Std with 90
percent FGD and 50 percent DENOX) across scenarios in 2020.
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Investment Costs for Conventional Coal Power Plants
in 2050
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Figure B. Histogram of investment costs for conventional coal power plants (Coal Std with 90
percent FGD and 50 percent DENOX) across scenarios in 2050.
Investment Costs for Conventional Coal Power Plants
in 2100
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Figure C. Histogram of investment costs for conventional coal power plants (Coal Std with 90
percent FGD and 50 percent DENOX) across scenarios in 2100.
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Investment Costs for Conventional Natural-Gas Power Plants
Histograms of frequency distribution of the investment costs of conventional (steam
cycle) natural gas power plants across scenarios, number of scenarios (from a total of 34)
and 1990 dollars per kW installed electric capacity. Figure A shows the investment costs
in 2020, Figure B in 2050 and Figure C in 2100. The relative positions of IIASA-WEC
scenarios are indicated in the histograms. Investment costs cluster during the whole time
horizon within the region of between $600 and 800 per kW installed electric capacity.
After 2020 the conventional steam-cycle power plants are gradually phased out in all
scenarios because advanced, more efficient and cleaner, technologies become more
competitive. Therefore, the installed capacities decline across the scenarios, more rapidly
in the mitigation scenarios, leading to little improvement in investment costs.
Investment Costs for Conventional Natural-Gas Power
Plants in 2020
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Figure A. Histogram of investment costs for conventional natural-gas power plants (Gas Std)
across scenarios in 2020.
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Investment Costs for Conventional Natural-Gas Power
Plants in 2050
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Figure B. Histogram of investment costs for conventional natural-gas power plants (Gas Std)
across scenarios in 2050.
Investment Costs for Conventional Natural-Gas Power
Plants in 2100
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Figure C. Histogram of investment costs for conventional natural-gas power plants (Gas Std)
across scenarios in 2100.
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Investment Costs for Solar Photovoltaics Power Plants
Histograms of frequency distribution of the investment costs of solar photovoltaics
electric generating capacity across scenarios, number of scenarios (from a total of 34) and
1990 dollars per kW installed electric capacity. Figure A shows the investment costs in
2020, Figure B in 2050 and Figure C in 2100. The relative positions of IIASA-WEC
scenarios are indicated in the histograms. Investment costs cluster during the whole time
horizon within the category of more than $1800 per kW installed electric capacity. In
fact, the median capacity costs in 2020 are substantially higher with about $2800 per kW
installed. Thereafter, the costs decline in many scenarios spreading virtually across the
whole range from $200 to more than $1800 per kW installed by 2100. Generally the
investment costs per unit capacity decline more rapidly in the mitigation scenarios
because of much higher scale of deployment. This illustrates very clearly at the scenario
level the effects of increasing returns. Most of the IIASA-WEC scenarios are situated
close to the median unit investment costs of about $1000 per kW installed for the period
after 2050. The main exceptions are the B and A2 scenarios that are much more intensive
in conventional technologies such as coal and nuclear power. Therefore, the installed
capacities increase only gradually in these two scenarios, leading to little improvement in
investment costs that continue to be situated in the category of $1800 and more per kW
installed.
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Figure A. Histogram of investment costs for solar photovoltaics power plants across scenarios in
2020.
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Investment Costs for Solar PV in 2050
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Figure B. Histogram of investment costs for solar photovoltaics power plants across scenarios in
2050.
Investment Costs for Solar PV in 2100
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Figure C. Histogram of investment costs for solar photovoltaics power plants across scenarios in
2100.
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Investment Costs for Natural-Gas Combined-Cycle Power Plants
Histograms of frequency distribution of the investment costs of natural gas combined-
cycle power plants across scenarios5, number of scenarios (from a total of 34) and 1990
dollars per kW installed electric capacity. Figure A shows the investment costs in 2020,
Figure B in 2050 and Figure C in 2100. The relative positions of IIASA-WEC scenarios
are indicated in the histograms. Investment costs cluster during the whole time horizon.
They fall between $400 and 800 per kW installed capacity in 2020. Later with substantial
expansion in installed capacities across all scenarios, in some of them costs decline down
to $200 per kW installed. The distribution of scenarios is fairly even across the cost
categories (initially two and latter three) with IIASA-WEC scenarios also being
distributed in same manner.
Investment Costs for GCC in 2020
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Figure A. Histogram of investment costs for natural-gas combined-cycle power plants (GCC,
without carbon removal and storge) across scenarios in 2020
5 Note that the histograms, presented in this section, do not include carbon removal or storage investment costs for
natural gas combined cycle (GCC) power plants. The combined-cycle power plants with carbon removal and storage in
the mitigation scenarios are assumed to have higher costs of about 20 percent.
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Investment Costs for GCC in 2050
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Figure B. Histogram of investment costs for natural-gas combined-cycle power plants (GCC,
without carbon removal and storage) across scenarios in 2050
Investment Costs for GCC in 2100
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Figure C. Histogram of investment costs for natural-gas combined-cycle power plants (costs for
carbon removal and storage are not included).across scenarios in 2100.
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Investment Costs for Biomass Power Plants
Histograms of frequency distribution of the investment costs of biomass power plants
across scenarios, number of scenarios (from a total of 34) and 1990 dollars per kW
installed electric capacity. Figure A shows the investment costs in 2020, Figure B in 2050
and Figure C in 2100. The relative positions of IIASA-WEC scenarios are indicated in
the histograms. Investment costs cluster during the whole time horizon. They are between
$1200 and 1600 per kW installed capacity in 2020 falling slightly to between $1000 and
1400 per kW installed capacity in 2050. However, the distribution remains essentially the
same over this period. Later with substantial expansion in installed capacities across all
scenarios, in some of them costs decline down to $800 per kW installed. The distribution
of scenarios is fairly even across the cost categories (initially two and latter three) with
IIASA-WEC scenarios also being distributed in same manner but with a higher mean.
Investment Costs for Biomass Power Plants in 2020
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Figure A. Histogram of investment costs for biomass power plants across scenarios in 2020.
Average costs for two biomass technologies, Bio STC and Bio GTC technologies (see Box 1).
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Investment Costs for Biomass Power Plants in 2050
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Figure B. Histogram of investment costs for biomass power plants across scenarios in 2050.
Average costs for two biomass technologies, Bio STC and Bio GTC technologies (see Box 1).
Investment Costs for Biomass Power Plants in 2100
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Figure C. Histogram of investment costs for biomass power plants across scenarios in 2100.
Average costs for two biomass technologies, Bio STC and Bio GTC technologies (see Box 1).
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Investment Costs for Wind Power Plants
Histograms of frequency distribution of the investment costs of wind power plants across
scenarios, number of scenarios (from a total of 34) and 1990 dollars per kW installed
electric capacity. Figure A shows the investment costs in 2020, Figure B in 2050 and
Figure C in 2100. The relative positions of IIASA-WEC scenarios are indicated in the
histograms. Investment costs cluster during the period through 2020 between $800 and
1200 per kW installed capacity. Thereafter, the costs generally fall but the most
expensive facilities still extend up to $1200 per kW installed. The scenarios also spread
out extending down to $400 per kW installed by 2050 and further down to $200 per kW
installed. The distribution of scenarios is fairly even across the cost categories (initially
two, three by 2050 and five by 2100) with IIASA-WEC scenarios also being distributed
in same manner. The distribution of mitigation and baseline scenarios is also quite even
across all cost categories.
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Figure A. Histogram of investment costs for wind power plants across scenarios in 2020.
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Investment Costs for Wind Power Plants in 2050
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Figure B. Histogram of investment costs for wind power plants across scenarios in 2050.
Investment Costs for Wind Power Plants in 2100
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Figure C. Histogram of investment costs for wind power plants across scenarios in 2100.
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Investment Cost for Hydrogen Production through Coal Gasification
Histograms of frequency distribution of the investment costs for hydrogen production
through coal gasification across scenarios, number of scenarios (from a total of 34) and
1990 dollars per kW production capacity. Figure A shows the investment costs in 2020,
Figure B in 2050 and Figure C in 2100. The relative positions of IIASA-WEC scenarios
are indicated in the histograms. Investment costs are distributed asymmetrically during
the whole time horizon. They are between $800 and 1400 per kW production capacity in
2020 falling slightly to between $600 and 1400 per kW in 2050 and 2100. However, the
distribution remains essentially the same over this period. There are basically three
groups of scenarios, the largest is with costs in the lower ranges with the other two groups
covering the higher investment cost ranges. Essentially, the two lower groups shift by one
category downward leaving the interval of $1000 to 1200 per kW unoccupied. The
distribution of scenarios is fairly even across the cost categories (initially two and latter
three) with IIASA-WEC scenarios also being distributed in same manner. The median
investment cost decline marginally from $990 per kW in 2020 to $780 per kW by 2050
and beyond. The cost reductions are quite modest because of relatively low hydrogen
prediction levels from this technology over the whole time period.
Investment Cost for Hydrogen Production through Coal
Gasification in 2020
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Figure A. Histogram of investment costs for hydrogen production through coal gasification across
scenarios in 2020.
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Investment Cost for Hydrogen Production through Coal
Gasification in 2050
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Figure B. Histogram of investment costs for hydrogen production through coal gasification across
scenarios in 2050.
Investment Cost for Hydrogen Production through Coal
Gasification in 2100
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Figure C. Histogram of investment costs for hydrogen production through coal gasification across
scenarios in 2100.
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Investment Cost for Liquids Production from Coal
Histograms of frequency distribution of the investment costs for coal liquefaction across
scenarios, number of scenarios (from a total of 34) and 1990 dollars per kW production
capacity. Figure A shows the investment costs in 2020, Figure B in 2050 and Figure C in
2100. The relative positions of IIASA-WEC scenarios are indicated in the histograms.
Investment costs are distributed asymmetrically during the whole time horizon. They are
between $1200 and 1600 per kW production capacity in 2020 falling slightly to between
$1000 and 1600 per kW in 2050 and 2100. However, the distribution remains essentially
the same over this period. Initially there are three groups of scenarios with majority of
costs clustering between the $1200 and 1400 per kW interval. A bit more than half of
these scenarios shift to the lower costs category in the subsequent periods. There are
basically three groups of scenarios, the largest is with costs in the lower ranges with the
other two groups covering the higher investment cost ranges. The IIASA-WEC scenarios
are distributed evenly over the initial two and subsequent three groups. The median
investment cost decline marginally from $1222 per kW in 2020 to $1205 per kW by 2050
and beyond. The cost reductions are quite modest because of relatively low coal
liquefaction prediction levels over the whole time period.
Investment Cost for Liquids Production from Coal in 2020
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Figure A. Histogram of investment costs for coal liquefaction across scenarios in 2020.
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Investment Cost for Liquids Production from Coal in 2050
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Figure B. Histogram of investment costs for coal liquefaction across scenarios in 2050.
Investment Cost for Liquids Production from Coal in 2100
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Figure C. Histogram of investment costs for coal liquefaction across scenarios in 2100.
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Investment Costs for Methanol Production from Coal
Histograms of frequency distribution of the investment costs for methanol production
from coal across scenarios number of scenarios (from a total of 34) and 1990 dollars per
kW production capacity. Figure A shows the investment costs in 2020, Figure B in 2050
and Figure C in 2100. The relative positions of IIASA-WEC scenarios are indicated in
the histograms. Investment costs cluster during the whole time horizon. They are grouped
within the interval of $1000 and 1400 per kW in 2020. Later with substantial expansion
in production capacities across all scenarios, in some of them costs decline down to $800
per kW leaving the upper end of the distribution essentially unchanged. The distribution
of scenarios is fairly even across the cost categories (initially two and later three) with
IIASA-WEC scenarios also being distributed in same manner.
Investment Costs for Methanol Production from Coal in
2020
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Figure A. Histogram of investment costs for methanol production from coal across scenarios in
2020.
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Investment Costs for Methanol Production from Coal in
2050
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Figure B. Histogram of investment costs for methanol production from coal across scenarios in
2050.
Investment Costs for Methanol Production from Coal in
2100
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Figure C. Histogram of investment costs for methanol production from coal across scenarios in
2100.
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Investment Costs for Ethanol Production from Biomass
Histograms of frequency distribution of the investment costs for ethanol production from
biomass across scenarios number of scenarios (from a total of 34) and 1990 dollars per
kW production capacity. Figure A shows the investment costs in 2020, Figure B in 2050
and Figure C in 2100. The relative positions of IIASA-WEC scenarios are indicated in
the histograms. Initially, the investment costs cluster within three cost categories ranging
from $800 to 1400 per kW. They are grouped within the interval of $1000 and 1400 per
kW production capacity in 2020. Thereafter, costs decline as the production of ethanol
expands across the scenarios. The range also increases from $400 to 1200 per kW by
2050 and is characterized by two pronounced distribution modes. Later with substantial
expansion in ethanol production, in some scenarios costs decline down to $400 per kW
leaving the upper end of the distribution essentially unchanged. The distribution
bifurcates by 2100 into two distinct and disconnected modes. The distribution of baseline
and mitigation scenarios is fairly even across the cost categories with IIASA-WEC
scenarios also being distributed in same manner. The median costs decline from more
than $1200 per kW in 2020 to $1150 per kW by 2050 and beyond.
Investment Costs for Ethanol Production from Biomass in
2020
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Figure A. Histogram of investment costs for ethanol production from biomass across scenarios in
2020.
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Investment Costs for Ethanol Production from Biomass in
2050
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Figure B. Histogram of investment costs for ethanol production from biomass across scenarios in
2050.
Investment Costs for Ethanol Production from Biomass in
2100
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Figure C. Histogram of investment costs for ethanol production from biomass l across scenarios
in 2100.
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Investment Costs for Methanol Production from Natural Gas
Histograms of frequency distribution of the investment costs for methanol production
from natural gas across scenarios number of scenarios (from a total of 34) and 1990
dollars per kW production capacity. Figure A shows the investment costs in 2020, Figure
B in 2050 and Figure C in 2100. The relative positions of IIASA-WEC scenarios are
indicated in the histograms. Investment costs cluster during the whole time horizon. They
are grouped within the interval of $400 and 800 per kW production capacity in 2020.
Later with the expansion in production capacities across all scenarios, in two of them
costs decline down to $200 per kW leaving the upper end of the distribution essentially
unchanged. The distribution of scenarios is skewed with a pronounced mode in the cost
interval of $400 to 600 per kW, but is fairly even across the cost categories (initially two
and later three) with IIASA-WEC scenarios clustering in the cost interval of $400 to 600
per kW. The median declines from $578 per kW in 2020 to $480 per kW by 2050 and
beyond.
Investment Costs for Methanol Production from Natural
Gas in 2020
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Figure A. Histogram of investment costs for methanol production from natural gas across
scenarios in 2020.
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Investment Costs for Methanol Production from Natural
Gas in 2050
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Figure B. Histogram of investment costs for methanol production from natural gas across
scenarios in 2050.
Investment Costs for Methanol Production from Natural
Gas in 2100
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Figure C. Histogram of investment costs for methanol production from natural gas across
scenarios in 2100.
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Investment Costs for Syngas Production from Coal
Histograms of frequency distribution of the investment costs for syngas production from
coal across scenarios number of scenarios (from a total of 34) and 1990 dollars per kW
production capacity. Figure A shows the investment costs in 2020, Figure B in 2050 and
Figure C in 2100. The relative positions of IIASA-WEC scenarios are indicated in the
histograms. Investment costs cluster during the whole time horizon. They are grouped
within the interval of $600 and 1000 per kW production capacity in 2020 with a
pronounced mode in the range of between $600 and 800 per kW. Later with the
expansion in production capacities across all scenarios, in many of the scenarios from the
first cost category ($600 to 800 per kW) costs decline down to $400 per kW leaving the
upper end of the distribution essentially unchanged. The distribution of scenarios is
initially skewed with a pronounced mode in the cost interval of $600 to 800 per kW.
Later it becomes more symmetrical with the same mode which becomes much less
pronounced. All IIASA-WEC scenarios cluster within the same interval where mode is
situated except the A1 scenario that is situated in a lower cost category of $400 to 600 per
kW. The median declines somewhat from $689 per kW in 2020 to $624 per kW by 2050
and beyond.
Investment Costs for Syngas Production from Coal in
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Figure A. Histogram of investment costs for syngas production from coal across scenarios in
2020.
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Investment Costs for Syngas Production from Coal in
2050
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Figure B. Histogram of investment costs for syngas production from coal across scenarios in
2050.
Investment Costs for Syngas Production from Coal in
2100
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Figure C. Histogram of investment costs for syngas production from coal across scenarios in
2100.
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Investment Costs for Syngas Production from Biomass
Histograms of frequency distribution of the investment costs for syngas production from
biomass across scenarios number of scenarios (from a total of 34) and 1990 dollars per
kW production capacity. Figure A shows the investment costs in 2020, Figure B in 2050
and Figure C in 2100. The relative positions of IIASA-WEC scenarios are indicated in
the histograms. Investment costs cluster during the whole time horizon. Initially, they are
grouped relatively evenly within the interval of $400 and 800 per kW production capacity
in 2020. Later with the expansion in production capacities in some mitigation scenarios,
the clustering becomes even more focused within the lower cost category of $400 to 600
per kW. It is notable that there is this relatively narrow distribution of investment costs by
2050 and beyond. This explains to an extent why the larger utilization of syngas from
biomass is limited to mitigation cases where decarbonization is another technology
selection factor in addition to the costs. The median declines somewhat from $548 per
kW in 2020 to $446 per kW by 2050 and beyond.
Investment Costs for Syngas Production from Biomass in
2020
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Figure A. Histogram of investment costs for syngas production from biomass across scenarios in
2020.
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Investment Costs for Syngas Production from Biomass in
2050
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Figure B. Histogram of investment costs for syngas production from biomass across scenarios in
2050.
Investment Costs for Syngas Production from Biomass in
2100
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Figure C. Histogram of investment costs for syngas production from biomass across scenarios in
2100.
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Investment Costs for Hydrogen Production from Natural Gas
Histograms of frequency distribution of the investment costs for hydrogen production
from steam reforming of natural gas across scenarios number of scenarios (from a total of
34) and 1990 dollars per kW production capacity. Figure A shows the investment costs in
2020, Figure B in 2050 and Figure C in 2100. The relative positions of IIASA-WEC
scenarios are indicated in the histograms. Investment costs cluster during the whole time
horizon. They are grouped within the interval of $200 and 600 per kW production
capacity in 2020 and 2050. Later with the significant expansion in production capacities
across many scenarios, costs decline down to less than $200 per kW leaving the upper
end of the distribution unchanged. The distribution of scenarios is initially skewed with a
pronounced mode in the cost interval of $200 to 400 per kW, but is fairly even across the
cost categories (initially two and later three) with IIASA-WEC scenarios clustering in the
cost interval of $200 to 600 per kW. The median declines from $578 per kW in 2020 to
$480 per kW by 2050 and beyond.
Investment Costs for Hydrogen Production from Natural
Gas in 2020
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Figure A. Histogram of investment costs for hydrogen production from natural gas across
scenarios in 2020.
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Investment Costs for Hydrogen Production from Natural
Gas in 2050
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
<200 200-400 400-600 600-800 800-
1000
1000-
1200
1200-
1400
1400-
1600
1600-
1800
>1800
Investment costs, US$90/kW
N
u
m
be
r
o
fS
c
e
n
a
rio
s
450 ppmv stabilization
550 ppmv stabilization
650 ppmv stabilization
750 ppmv stabilization
Baseline scenarios
median = 270 $/kW
IIASA-WEC A1, A3, B, C1, C2
IIASA-WEC A2
Figure B. Histogram of investment costs for hydrogen production from natural gas across
scenarios in 2050.
Investment Costs for Hydrogen Production from Natural
Gas in 2100
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
<200 200-400 400-600 600-800 800-
1000
1000-
1200
1200-
1400
1400-
1600
1600-
1800
>1800
Investment costs, US$90/kW
N
u
m
be
r
o
fS
c
e
n
a
rio
s
450 ppmv stabilization
550 ppmv stabilization
650 ppmv stabilization
750 ppmv stabilization
Baseline scenarios
median = 270 $/kW
IIASA-WEC A1, A2,
IIASA-WEC A2
Figure C. Histogram of investment costs for hydrogen production from natural gas across
scenarios in 2100.
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Investment Costs for Hydrogen Production from Biomass
Histograms of frequency distribution of the investment costs for hydrogen production
from biomass across scenarios number of scenarios (from a total of 34) and 1990 dollars
per kW production capacity. Figure A shows the investment costs in 2020, Figure B in
2050 and Figure C in 2100. The relative positions of IIASA-WEC scenarios are indicated
in the histograms. Investment costs cluster during the whole time horizon. They are
grouped within the interval of $600 and 1000 per kW production capacity in 2020. Later
with the expansion in production capacities across some scenarios, costs decline down to
less than $400 per kW leaving the upper end of the distribution unchanged. The
distribution of scenarios is skewed with a pronounced mode in the cost interval of $400 to
600 per kW in 2020. The mode shifts to the lower category of between $400 to 600 per
kW by 2050 and beyond. The distribution of scenarios is fairly even across the cost
categories (initially two and later three) with IIASA-WEC scenarios also extending over
all three cost categories.. The distribution of the scenarios remains unchanged between
2050 and 2100. The median declines from $752 per kW in 2020 to $565 per kW by 2050
and beyond.
Investment Costs for Hydrogen Production from Biomass
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Figure A. Histogram of investment costs for hydrogen production from biomass across scenarios
in 2020.
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Investment Costs for Hydrogen Production from Biomass
in 2050
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Figure B. Histogram of investment costs for hydrogen production from biomass across scenarios
in 2050.
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Figure C. Histogram of investment costs for hydrogen production from biomass across scenarios
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129
Investment Costs for Hydrogen Production from Electricity
Histograms of frequency distribution of the investment costs for hydrogen production by
electrolysis across scenarios number of scenarios (from a total of 34) and 1990 dollars per
kW production capacity. Figure A shows the investment costs in 2020, Figure B in 2050
and Figure C in 2100. The relative positions of IIASA-WEC scenarios are indicated in
the histograms. Investment costs cluster during the whole time horizon. They are grouped
within the interval of $200 and 600 per kW production capacity in 2020 and 2050. The
scenario distributions are marked with pronounced modes both in 2020 and 2050, but
with complete asymmetry reversal. The mode is in the interval of $400 to 600 per kW in
2020 and in the interval $200 to 400 per kW in 2050. This reversal of the asymmetric
distributions reduces the median value from $428 in 2020 to $380 per kW in 2050. The
expansion of electrolysis is negligible also in the following periods through 2100.
Nevertheless, investment costs decline in some of the scenarios making the distribution
almost completely symmetrical by 2100. The distribution of scenarios is fairly even
across the cost categories (initially two and later three) with IIASA-WEC scenarios also
extending over all higher two cost categories.
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Figure A. Histogram of investment costs for hydrogen production by electrolysis across scenarios
in 2020.
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Investment Costs for Hydrogen Production from
Electricity in 2050
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Figure B. Histogram of investment costs for hydrogen production by electrolysis across scenarios
in 2050.
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Figure C. Histogram of investment costs for hydrogen production by electrolysis across scenarios
in 2100.
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Investment Costs for Hydrogen Production from Nuclear Energy
Histograms of frequency distribution of the investment costs of hydrogen production
from high-temperature reactors across scenarios, number of scenarios (from a total of 34)
and 1990 dollars per kW production capacity. Figure A shows the investment costs in
2020, Figure B in 2050 and Figure C in 2100. The relative positions of IIASA-WEC
scenarios are indicated in the histograms. Only four IIASA-WEC scenarios assume that
hydrogen production form high-temperature reactors will be available at the market
before 2020. Their investment costs cluster within a narrow interval between $1000 and
$1200 per kW production capacity. The costs are higher for other scenarios with the most
expensive facilities extending to more than $1800 per kW production capacity in 2050
(see Figure B). The distribution is almost bi-modal. Most of the scenarios occupy the
highest (more than $1800 per kW) and the lowest category ($1000 to 1200 per kW) with
only two scenarios situated half way in-between, the adjacent categories remaining
unoccupied. The distribution of scenarios is asymmetric even across the cost categories
(initially one and three in 2050 and 2100) with IIASA-WEC scenarios also being situated
in the lowest category over the whole period. Most of the mitigation scenarios are in the
highest cost category.
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Figure A. Histogram of investment costs for hydrogen production by nuclear energy across
scenarios in 2020.
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Investment Costs for Hydrogen Production from Nuclear
Energy in 2050
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Figure B. Histogram of investment costs for hydrogen production by nuclear energy across
scenarios in 2050.
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Figure C. Histogram of investment costs for hydrogen production by nuclear energy across
scenarios in 2100.
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Investment Costs for Hydrogen Production from Solar Thermal
Histograms of frequency distribution of the investment costs of hydrogen production
form solar thermal plants across scenarios, number of scenarios (from a total of 34) and
1990 dollars per kW production capacity. Figure A shows the investment costs in 2020,
Figure B in 2050 and Figure C in 2100. The relative positions of IIASA-WEC scenarios
are indicated in the histograms. Only four IIASA-WEC scenarios assume that hydrogen
production from solar thermal will be available at the market before 2020. Their
investment costs cluster within a very high interval extending above $1800 per kW
production capacity. Thereafter, the costs decrease in the majority of scenarios. In fact,
the distribution becomes tri-modal and almost completely symmetric and invariant
between 2050 and 2100. The lowest mode falls in the interval between $600 and 800 per
kW. The majority of the scenarios are mitigation cases. The middle mode is between
$1200 and 1400 per kW. It includes only baseline scenarios including all IIASA-WEC
scenarios. The highest modes continues to extend over the region beyond $1800 per kW
production capacity. Here again the majority of scenarios are mitigation cases. The
spaces between the three modes are unoccupied. Consequently, the median falls from
$1960 per kW in 2020 to $1200 per kW production capacity.
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Figure A. Histogram of investment costs for hydrogen production by solar thermal across
scenarios in 2020.
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Investment Costs for Hydrogen Production from Solar
Thermal in 2050
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Figure B. Histogram of investment costs for hydrogen production by solar thermal across
scenarios in 2050.
Investment Costs for Hydrogen Production from Solar
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Figure C. Histogram of investment costs for hydrogen production by solar thermal across
scenarios in 2100.
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